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Executive Summary 
In the current changing world order, UN peace operations remain one of 
the foremost symbols of international cooperation and collective global 
governance. In the context of the recommendations of the High Level In-
dependent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), this report analyses the 
positions of a group of rising powers on UN peace operations reform. The 
countries selected for this study are Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indone-
sia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey. The Peace Capacities (PeaceCap) 
Network undertook a joint research project where research institutes 
from each of these countries contributed their own respective country 
studies. The aim was to give voice to authentic national narratives on UN 
peace operations, rather than an external interpretation. The current re-
port is a synthesis of the country studies and provides a comparative 
analysis. 
This report considers the stance of these rising powers on a number 
of critical UN peace operations reform issues like conflict prevention; the 
principles of peacekeeping, including the use of force, robust peace-
keeping and enforcement operations; integration and the so-called full 
spectrum approach; peacekeeping capabilities; as well as sovereignty 
and national ownership. 
Seven of these eight countries are among the top 20 troop and police 
contributors (T/PCCs), yet traditionally they have exercised little influ-
ence on mandate, policy and doctrine formulation. As the findings in 
this report show, these rising powers are no longer satisfied with this 
limited role, and are set to play a more assertive role on the direction of 
UN peace operations in future. 
Overall, the countries covered in this study maintain that the United 
Nations is the most legitimate body to deal with international peace and 
security issues. They regard the UN as a credible forum where states can 
reach agreement on shared norms and common approaches. They con-
sider UN peace operations as one of the UN’s most visible tools, and 
therefore it is of great symbolic value as an example of the international 
community’s collective will. As such the stakes are high and most coun-
tries have a keen interest in how UN peace operations will develop in the 
future. 
All the rising powers covered in this report support the HIPPO’s em-
phasis on the primacy of politics when it comes to conflict resolution. In 
fact, several of these countries perceive themselves as regional peace-
makers and take an active role in various mediation initiatives. These 
countries also exhibit a strong preference for consensual peacekeeping, 
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which makes them weary of the trend toward more robustness and the 
use of force in recent UN missions. They are concerned that the trend 
may suggest a growing preference for externally imposed military solu-
tions. Their preferred approach is for locally grounded negotiated polit-
ical solutions. 
In the view of these rising powers, the principles of peacekeeping 
(consent, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence or in de-
fence of the mandate) remain the cornerstone of UN peacekeeping, and 
its best guarantee for success.  They are concerned about the increas-
ingly ambitious mandates given to UN peace operations, and the blur-
ring of lines between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. For them, 
force should only be used in UN peacekeeping if it is minimal, calibrated, 
proportional and in conformity with international humanitarian law. 
All of the countries included in this study seek to strengthen cooper-
ation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and T/PCCs. They 
want more influence for T/PCCs in shaping mission mandates. On the 
basis of their own, not always positive, experience with the mandating 
process and its implications for new and existing T/PCCs, they wish to 
be consulted at an earlier stage in the mandating process and when man-
dates are revised.  
These countries stress sovereignty and national ownership as core 
norms, on which the UN Charter is based, that must be respected at all 
stages during peace and conflict resolution processes. They are against 
the imposition of external solutions, and they believe that a key role for 
UN peace operations should be to help with the capacity building of na-
tional institutions, specifically in the area of security, rule of law and 
justice. 
In conclusion, while the rising powers in this study do not agree on 
every policy issue and do not always speak with one voice, they do share 
a common normative approach to global governance, and they agree on 
the central role of the UN, and especially UN peace operations, in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. In their view, UN peace 
operations remains an important common project, a shared experience 
that helps foster co-ownership of the United Nations as a collective secu-
rity regime, and as the foundation for an emerging rule-based global or-
der. 
Introduction 
The global order is experiencing significant turbulence as it shifts from 
a period of relative stability under a unipolar order to a new era of mul-
tipolar uncertainty. One of the characteristics of this new era is the emer-
gence, or re-emergence in some cases, of a number of states that have 
gained sufficient economic and political power over the last decades to 
challenge the hegemony of the West over the main instruments of global 
governance. We refer to these countries loosely as rising powers because 
their power and influence in global politics are growing in importance. 
In this new multipolar era, the West and the rising powers have to ac-
commodate and consider each other when it comes to the future direc-
tion of global governance. In this report we consider what the implica-
tions of these changes in the global order are for UN peace operations. 
China has become the second largest economy in the world and, at 
least until recently, the main engine of global economic growth. It has 
also become increasingly assertive, especially in its immediate neigh-
bourhood. In the aftermath of the intervention in Libya and subsequent 
chaos, Russia has taken a forceful stance in Syria and Ukraine to check 
what it perceives as interventions and manipulations by the West to 
change governments that do not subscribe to their neo-liberal ideology. 
India, Brazil and South Africa have similarly emerged as significant eco-
nomic and political players in their regions, and in the case of India, in 
the global economy. These countries have come together in 2011 to form 
the BRICS (Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa) grouping. In 
the BRICS and Coexistence, de Coning, Mandrup & Odgaard1 argue that 
the BRICS articulate an alternative framework for global governance 
which they call coexistence. Coexistence is a type of global order that is 
inherently pluralist in the sense that it allows for countries and regions 
with different world views, religions, political systems and approaches 
to national development to coexist, without one ideational system dom-
inating the others. They argue that the coexistence strategy pursued by 
the BRICS consists of four basic principles: mutual respect for sover-
eignty and territorial integrity; interference in the internal affairs of 
other states only within the framework of multilaterally agreed upon 
norms and rules; mutual non-aggression and the legal equality of states; 
and the promotion of mutual benefits and national development paths. 
As will be discussed later in this report, these principles also influence 
the role these countries assign to UN peace operations as a tool to main-
tain the global order. 
                                                          
1  Cedric de Coning, Thomas Mandrup and Liselotte Odgaard (eds.), The BRICS and 
Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World Order, London: Routledge, 2015. 
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The BRICS grouping is not the only countries that have emerged in 
recent years to play a more prominent role on the world stage. Several 
others, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, the 
Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam have similar rising influence profiles. 
Not all these countries could, however, be included in this Peace Capac-
ities Network research project.2 The rising powers selected for this study 
included the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as 
well as Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey. These countries were selected to 
serve as a sample of countries that reflect the rising power profile, and 
in an attempt to represent all the major geo-political regions of the world.  
UN peacekeeping is the foremost symbol of international cooperation 
and collective global governance. The group of rising powers covered in 
this report play an increasingly important role in shaping and contrib-
uting to international peace and security. All these countries, except 
Russia, are among the top 20 T/PCCs. However, as this report will show, 
these countries are no longer content with only being T/PCCs, and they 
are now also starting to develop the will and capacity to influence policy 
and doctrine formulation.   
This report analyses their contributions, motivations and policies to 
UN peace operations at a time when the future direction of UN peace op-
erations are under critical review. The High Level Independent Panel on 
Peace Operations (HIPPO) submitted its report in mid-2015, and the Sec-
retary-General has issued his own report on the HIPPO for the 2015 Gen-
eral Assembly session. Since then these reports have been considered in 
various UN bodies, and whilst some aspects are being implemented by 
the Secretariat many others are still being debated. 
UN member states contribute soldiers and police officers to UN peace 
operations, and their costs are reimbursed according to a scale of assess-
ment agreed upon at the UN. All member states of the UN contribute to 
the cost of peace operations on the basis of a formula that takes their 
GDP and a number of other factors into account. The scale of assessment 
was reviewed and updated in 2015. Over the last few decades a gap has 
emerged between those countries that pay the bulk of the costs and those 
countries that contribute the bulk of the peacekeepers. For example, the 
West and Japan contributes approximately 80% of the nearly 9 billion 
USD annual budget for peacekeeping operations. In 2016, the USA con-
tributes 28.5%, whilst China, India and Russia contribute 10.3%, 4% 
                                                          
2  The Peace Capacities (PeaceCap) project consist of a network of research institutes 
in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Norway, Russia, South Africa and Turkey. The have 
cooperated since 2012 in research on civilian capacity, security sector reform and 
peace operations. The network is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The research produced by the network can be found at http://www.peace-
cap.org 
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and 0.15% respectively.3 China and France are the largest troop contrib-
utors among the permanent members of the Security Council with a and 
b respectively. The countries in South East Asia—Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan—have consistently been among the top five troop and police 
contributors to UN peacekeeping. Together these countries contribute 
approximately 34% of UN peacekeepers. Another significant regional 
grouping in UN peacekeeping is Africa. Twelve of the top 20 troop con-
tributors are from Africa. Together the African countries contribute ap-
proximately 50% of all UN peacekeepers.  
The difference in perspectives and interests between those who pay 
for UN peacekeeping and those who contribute the troops and police can 
result in divergent opinions and understandings with regards to the 
identity and role of UN peacekeeping operations, what needs to be done 
to improve and strengthen peace operations, and what direction UN 
peace operations should take in the future. However, not all those coun-
tries that are major troop or police contributors, or those that make a fi-
nancial contribution, necessarily agree on all aspects related to UN 
peace operations. As this report also shows, countries have taken differ-
ent positions on various issues, and alternative understandings need to 
be acknowledged, understood and recognized. The maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security is a collective effort and UN peace opera-
tions are one of its principle tools. In fact, it is the single most visual, and 
therefore symbolic, example of the international community’s collective 
will and collaborative action. As such the stakes are high and most coun-
tries have a keen interest in how UN peace operations develop. Natu-
rally, the national interests and domestic compulsions of individual 
member states have an impact on their policies towards UN peace oper-
ations. At the same time, UN peace operations can only be effective and 
successful if there is broad agreement among member states about its 
purpose and role. It is therefore necessary that these national policies 
are known and understood, and that through dialogue at the UN and 
elsewhere compromises are found among nations in order to arrive at 
the broadest possible collective agreement on the role and scope of UN 
peace operations. In this spirit this report is an attempt to shed light on 
the national policies of a sample of rising powers, with a view to see how 
their views may influence the future direction of peace operations. 
In light of the recommendations of the HIPPO Panel, this report will 
analyse the stance the rising powers have taken on a number of im-
portant issues like conflict prevention; the principles of peacekeeping, 
including the use of force, robust peacekeeping and enforcement opera-
tions; integration and the so-called full spectrum approach; peacekeep-
                                                          
3  Effective rates of assessment for peacekeeping operations, 1 January 2016 to 31 De-
cember 2018, based on the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly 
in its resolution 70/245 and the composition of levels endorsed by the Assembly in 
its resolution 70/246, United Nations, 28 December 2015. 
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ing capabilities; as well as sovereignty and national ownership. This re-
port considers the policies, experiences and opinions of eight rising 
powers on the future of peace operations. It is based on a series of coun-
try studies undertaken by the research institutes in Brazil, China, India, 
Russia, South Africa, Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey. This report is an at-
tempt to synthesise the observations and findings of the eight country 
reports written by the Peace Capacities Network partners. In the follow-
ing section each of the country reports will be summarised and then, in 
the final section, their positions will be analysed and discussed.
Brazil4 
 Brazil has regularly deployed military personnel to UN peace operations 
since 1948. It has provided a small but consistent number of troops to 
50 missions (approx. 70%) out of the 71 ever authorised by the UN Se-
curity Council. In the majority of cases, Brazil has deployed profession-
als (military observers and/or staff officers) in missions. It has also de-
ployed troops to eight missions namely UNEF I (Suez), ONUMOZ 
(Mozambique), UNAVEM III (Angola), INTERFET / UNTAET / UNMISET 
(Timor Leste), MINUSTAH (Haiti – ongoing) and UNIFIL (Lebanon – on-
going).  
The missions with greater Brazilian engagement, in terms of numbers 
of troops deployed, were located within Brazil’s political area of influ-
ence, with the exception of UNEF I (the first UN mission with troops).  It 
can be inferred that Brazil has mainly contributed troops and police of-
ficers to those peacekeeping operations that have geopolitical linkages 
with its foreign policy priorities, exemplified, for instance, by the mis-
sions to Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the Dominican Republic (the only OAS 
mission with Brazilian troops). Other important factors are historical 
linkages, such as former Portuguese colonies (Mozambique, Angola and 
Timor Leste) and places, such as the Middle East, from which a consid-
erable amount of immigrants have settled in Brazil. 
 Brazil has also deployed both troops and military advisors to opera-
tions under the Organization of the American States (OAS). From 2000 
onwards, Brazil has participated in 3 demining missions: MARMINAS 
(Ecuador and Peru), MARMINCA (Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica) 
and it still participates in the Inter-American Monitors Group of the OAS 
Assistance Mission to the National Demining Plan in Colombia (“GP Mon 
Inter” or GMI). 
Motivations to Participate in Peace Operations 
 Brazil’s actions on international peace and security are guided by the 
same principles on which the UN was founded. As such Brazil believes 
that the UN is the legal and the most legitimate authority to deal with 
international peace and security issues at the global level.5 At the tacti-
cal level, the motivation is related to operational needs and interests. In 
                                                          
4  The country study of Brazil was undertaken by the Igarapé Institute of Brazil. 
5  Hamann, E. (2012).  
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the last 15 years, Brazil’s military and police contingents have partici-
pated in UN peacekeeping operations in operational and logistic terms.6 
Evidence shows that prestige/status in the international system is an-
other motivation for participation. There is a recurrent argument that 
Brazil’s participation in peacekeeping is related to its interest to obtain 
a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Although this is not offi-
cially stated by the Brazilian government, engaging in peacekeeping 
would eventually support this aspiration. 
It is often argued that developing countries’ active participation in 
peace operations is associated with UN’s financial reimbursement. How-
ever, Brazil is only partially reimbursed by the UN. For example, the 
country is fully responsible for the transportation of its battalions to 
Haiti and also for the use of some of its equipment for which it does not 
get reimbursed. The second Brazilian battalion deployed in Haiti (for 2 
years) that was entirely financed by the Brazilian government. Not to 
mention the very expensive six-month training through which the troops 
undergo before deployment. Therefore, the money received through the 
UN system of reimbursement does not serve as an incentive.  
Policy Related Key Issues 
Brazilian foreign policy has been evolved over a strong preference to-
wards diplomacy, international law, multilateralism and consensus 
building. In its international actions, the country also follows two other 
principles: peaceful conflict-resolution and non-intervention, explicitly 
mentioned in Article 4 of the Constitution. At the tactical level, Brazil’s 
position largely follows the Capstone Doctrine, as well as the key peace-
keeping principles of consent, impartiality and minimum level of force7.  
Although Brazil’s participation in peace operations dates from the 
mid-20th century, it was only after the 1990s that major policy changes 
related to its participation started taking place. Main changes relate to 
deployment of police; evolving, albeit conservative, approach on using 
force; and participation of Brazilian women in peacekeeping. 
In early 1990s, Brazil started to put in place a system to identify and 
deploy Brazilian military police officers and lower ranking police per-
sonnel to the UN peace operations. It started not by a strategic vision of 
a government, but as a reaction of a demand by the UN Secretary-Gen-
                                                          
6  Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB). 
http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/index.php/en/operacoes-de-paz/missoes-em-anda-
mento.  
7  CCOPAB. 
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eral to deploy Brazilian police first to Angola (1991), then to Mozam-
bique (1993).8 However, the numbers remain very low. It is also note-
worthy that neither the civilian police nor the federal police participate 
in peacekeeping.  
An important shift happened with respect to the participation of Bra-
zil in Chapter VII missions and use of force in 1999. Until then, Brazil 
would often refrain from sending troops to UN missions under Chapter 
VII or with Chapter VII provisions. The first time in 1999, Brazil deployed 
a platoon to INTERFET (Timor Leste), a Chapter VII mission with an 
agreement with the UN that the Brazilian troops would only engage with 
policing tasks, such as patrolling, protecting authorities, securing con-
voys, etc.9  While at the political level Brazil agreed to participate in a 
Chapter VII mission, at the tactical level, Brazilian troops were not to use 
force. However, in 2004, there was a more dramatic change with MI-
NUSTAH (Haiti). It was the first UN mission under Chapter VII in which 
Brazil actually used force, especially in the pacification phase (2005-
2007).  To a lesser extent, the provision of a Brazilian general as the 
Force Commander in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) is also a signal of change of 
policy in this regard. But in Brazil, this is considered an exception and to 
be done with caution.  
 Brazilian women’s quantitative and qualitative participation in 
peace operations is low and has a direct relationship with their numbers 
in the national military force. In 2015, women comprise of 7% of Brazil-
ian military of 23,787 officials.10 Their presence is usually in the tech-
nical, administrative and health-related areas except as the Air Force 
aviators.  The absence of Brazilian women in combat positions (particu-
larly in the Army which sends the vast majority of troops to peace oper-
ations) has a bearing on their participation in UN peacekeeping mis-
sions. The first Brazilian military woman to participate in a UN mission 
was a doctor (captain), deployed to Timor Leste in 2003. In MINUSTAH, 
women started to join the Brazilian troops in 2006 and until January 
2014, 124 women from the Army had been deployed (dentists, nurses, 
translators and engineers). In April 2015, out of 1678 Brazilian troops 
deployed, only 18 (all in Haiti), about 1% are women. The UN Mission in 
Lebanon had one Brazilian woman in the Navy contingent from a total 
of 267 troops. And, until today, only one Brazilian military woman has 
participated in peace operations as a military observer.  
Recently, Brazil has launched the drafting process of a National Ac-
tion Plan on Women, Peace and Security, thereby standing to its com-
mitment of fostering the participation of women in peace missions; and 
providing humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation to post-
                                                          
 8  Hamann, E. and Kenkel, K. (2013).  
 9  Fontoura, P. (2005).  
10  Giannini, R. (2014) ; Giannini, et al (2015). 
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conflict countries concerning gender issues. This initiative supports the 
Brazilian emphasis on the necessity of dealing with protection and em-
powerment as inseparable aspects of the Women, Peace and Security 
Agenda.11  
 Brazil’s diplomatic statements heavily lean towards preventive and 
non-coercive actions, such as persuasion and capacity building. Brazil 
argues that social and economic developments are necessary tools for 
conflict prevention. There is a concern in finding concrete measures to 
translate the relation between security and development, going beyond 
the purely military view of conflict prevention.12 
 Brazil is of the view that peacekeeping must create the conditions for 
effective prevention or the definitive resolution of the conflict. Peace-
keeping is not the main tool/actor responsible for achieving lasting 
peace but the parties to the conflict are. In this sense, the most important 
tasks of peacekeeping operations include offering to the parties an ena-
bling political and security environment, as well as the time they may 
need to establish the basis for sustainable peace. The limits are also 
clear: peacekeeping missions should not become a third party in the con-
flict or replace them. The UN’s role is to provide support for sustainable 
peace, not to impose a solution to the conflict. Building peace is thus a 
role that ought to be carried out by the conflict parties.13 Brazil has wel-
comed the recommendations of the UN High-Level on Peace Operations 
and the 10-year review of the United Nations peacebuilding architec-
ture, emphasizing the centrality of conflict prevention and social devel-
opment to the promotion of a sustainable peace.14  
Brazil argues that it is neither possible nor desirable to draw a water-
tight separation between activities of “peacekeeping” and those of 
“peacebuilding”. There should be no peacekeeping without peacebuild-
ing, and peacekeepers must be seen as early peacebuilders. Peace can 
only be sustainable if socio and economic activities are also included in 
the equation. Therefore, the UN missions need not only to stop violence 
but also to prepare the conditions for the future leading to sustainability.  
 Brazil opines that to build sustainable peace, the three peacekeeping 
principles should be respected. Moreover, it is essential that the UN role 
in any activity is based on dialogue with local society, which should 
have the prerogative to lead the peace process. The imposition of exter-
nal priorities and solutions without adapting to local conditions should 
be avoided at all costs otherwise it could undermine stabilization efforts 
                                                          
11  Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 7533 (13 Oct 2015)  
12  Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 7109 (12 Feb 2014) and UNSC meeting 7374 
(30 Jan 2015).  
13  Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
14  Statement by Brazil at UNSC open debate on security, development and root causes 
of conflicts (17 Sep 2015). 
Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report. Rising Powers and Peace Operations 15 
and sustainability. The UN itself and peacekeeping operations in partic-
ular, are based on three pillars: peace and security, development, and 
human rights. To build sustainable peace, it is mandatory to work not 
only with the political elements but also social and economic elements. 
During Brazil’s presidency at the UNSC (Feb. 2011), there was a high-
level debate on the “interdependence between security and develop-
ment”.15 The Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH (from 2004 to date) 
has been referred to as a “laboratory” for peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing in terms of the civil-military cooperation and Quick Impact Project 
(QIPs) activities.  
Brazil has observed that there is a clear over-representation in the 
field and under-representation in the UNSC of developing countries. As 
a consequence, Brazil has reiterated the need for the UNSC to hold ample 
and regular consultations with the T/PCCs during the preparation and 
the evaluation of peacekeeping mandates. More partnership is also 
needed to bridge this gap. In the future, a reformed UNSC, more repre-
sentative and more inclusive, would have greater legitimacy to draft 
peacekeeping mandates in line with the aspirations of developing coun-
tries and therefore is more likely to get support and contributions of 
troops and equipment from the member states.16 
Brazil has also supported initiatives that reinforce the political im-
portance of the C-34 (could be seen as a type of “global partnership”). 
For example, Brazil has made efforts to reduce the polarization between 
the negotiating groups of the Committee. It is in Brazil's interest to help 
building consensus on the most relevant issues of the agenda, in order 
to avoid deadlocks that would weaken the UNGA as a forum for dialogue 
and negotiation on peacekeeping; which in turn would give the UNSC 
the exclusive prerogative to deal with these issues.17 
Developing countries supply about 90% of all UN peacekeeping 
troops. Although it is not possible to draw a common profile, there are a 
few shared positions. Among the groups that seek to reflect these shared 
positions on PKOs, the most important is the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), which plays a central role in the C-34. Its weight is reflected in 
the fact that it “speaks” on behalf of most of the Troop/Police Contrib-
uting Countries (T/PCCs): among the 25 largest T/PCCs, only three (Uru-
guay, Brazil and China) are not NAM members. Moreover, most countries 
hosting peacekeeping operations are NAM members. NAM has played an 
important role in defending the basic principles of PKO, and Brazil has 
closely collaborated with them on this matter, as well as on others issues 
                                                          
15  See: http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-
br/file/CAD/LXIII%20CAD/Politica/Concept%20Note.pdf. Also see the Presidential 
Statement: www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10172.doc.htm. 
16  Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
17 Idem. 
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such as the need to increase support for T/PCCs through timely payment 
of reimbursements, increasing the troop cost and supporting staff train-
ing.18 In general, Brazil supports the following common positions19: 
a. Need to observe national interests of countries emerging 
from conflict. UN action must be based on dialogue with 
local authorities, avoiding the imposition of external prior-
ities. Similarly, it is important to get a maximum use of ex-
isting local capacities, with due appreciation and strength-
ening of national institutions; 
b. Need for the international community to assist conflict-
emerging countries not only on issues like security and jus-
tice, but also in social and economic terms such as job cre-
ation, economic revitalisation, basic services and infra-
structure. 
c. More significant role of women, emphasising its im-
portance to restore the social fabric as to the local econ-
omy. 
Brazil supports the need to promote national ownership so that the in-
terests of countries emerging from conflict are ensured. UN’s actions, it 
expresses must be based on dialogue with local authorities and avoid 
the imposition of external priorities. The civil society should have the 
prerogative to lead the peace process. The imposition of external priori-
ties and solutions without adapting to local conditions should be 
avoided at all costs otherwise it could undermine stabilisation efforts to-
wards sustainability. Similarly, it is important to make maximum use of 
existing local capacities and strengthen the national institutions.  
The above also impacts the Brazil’s position on military intervention, 
which is often based on the condemnation of intervention in domestic 
affairs including serious violations of human rights (e.g. Libya and 
Syria). Brazil’s preference is for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and 
the use of force being the last resort. Brazil is in favour of democratic 
governments. This has been illustrated by the constant support to elec-
tions in Haiti and the agreement to the democratic clause at the Organi-
sation of American States (OAS). Nonetheless, there are expressed con-
cerns when democracy involves imposition and/or external interven-
tion. 
With respect to protection of civilians (POC), back in 1999, Brazil’s 
official position was marked by: (1) concerns about the high level of ci-
vilian deaths in armed conflicts and the need to protect these groups 
                                                          
18  Idem. 
19  Idem. 
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(parallel to the need of protecting non-combatants according to interna-
tional humanitarian law); (2) the need to think about humanitarian sup-
port as something that does not automatically entail the use of force; and 
(3) issues regarding arms trade, since they were/are eventually respon-
sible for putting civilians in danger.20 In 2004, Brazil’s discourse started 
to include the notion that peacekeeping missions are also responsible 
for implementing POC strategies21. In 2009, Brazil became more vocal 
on legality and accountability in international interventions, and has 
since then been advocating that Chapter VII tools should be used with a 
high level of specificity and monitoring.22 Finally, in 2011, after the con-
troversial UN mission in Libya, Brazil launched the expression “Respon-
sibility while protecting” (RwP),23 which includes the following ele-
ments: 
a. Prevention is always the best tool; 
b. Maximum commitment to use all peaceful means to protect civilians 
in armed conflicts; 
c. The use of force should be authorized by the UNSC and in accordance 
with Chapter VII; 
d. The authorization to use force should respect legal, operational and 
time constraints, and must be in accordance with international human-
itarian law; 
e. Minimum force should be used, and it should not result in more dam-
age or instability than it meant to prevent; 
f. The implementation should be fair, proportional and limited to the 
goals established by the UNSC; 
g. There should be constant monitoring of the field mission, on the ap-
plication of the above elements/principles; and 
h. The UNSC should be responsible to guarantee transparency and ac-
countability of those who use force.  
In the last 25 years, Brazil’s position on international interventions (in-
cluding for humanitarian and for protection of civilians) has tended to 
be towards non-intervention, the only exception being Rwanda24. Brazil 
was on the UNSC when the Rwandan crisis escalated in 1993-1994 and 
                                                          
20  Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 3977 (12 Feb 1999).  
21  Statements by Brazil at UNSC meeting 4990 (14 Jun 2004); at UNSC meeting 5209 
(21 Jun 2005); at UNSC meeting 6066 (14 Jan 2009); and at UNSC meeting 6216 (11 
Nov 2009). 
22  Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 6151 (26 Jun 2009).  
23  A/66/551 & S/2011/701 (11 Nov 2011) and Statement by Brazil at UNSC meeting 
6650 (09 Nov 2011). 
24   See Hamann. E. (2012); Hermann, B. (2011) and Britto, A. (2012). 
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it explicitly supported the use of force to stop genocide. However, Bra-
zil’s position was against intervention in 3 other key cases of gross vio-
lations of human rights: Kosovo (1998-1999), Darfur (esp. 2004-2006) 
and Libya (2011). 
Brazil usually demonstrates more reluctance than willingness to act 
in humanitarian crises when the use of force is involved, including for 
peace operations25. Brazil often leans heavily towards preventive and 
non-coercive actions, such as persuasion and capacity building. Brazil 
has a historical preference for peaceful resolution of conflicts, where the 
use of force should happen only as the very last resort.  
In UN peacekeeping, the country explicitly defends the three tradi-
tional principles: consent, impartiality and non-use of force, except in 
self-defence and in defence of the mandate. As a consequence, Brazil has 
refrained from sending troops to UN missions under Chapter VII or with 
Chapter VII provisions, even if it is to protect civilians. The first (limited) 
initiative took place in 1999, when Brazil deployed a platoon to INTER-
FET (Timor Leste), a clear Chapter VII mission. Even here there was an 
understanding with the UN that the Brazilian troops would only under-
take policing tasks, such as patrolling, protecting authorities and infra-
structure, securing convoys, among others.26 While at the political level 
it was agreed to participate in a Chapter VII mission, at the tactical level, 
there was no use of force by Brazilian troops. However, this position 
changed again and more dramatically in 2004, in MINUSTAH (Haiti). 
This was the first UN mission under Chapter VII in which Brazil actually 
used force, especially in the pacification phase (2005-2007). 
Brazil has also noted a growing willingness of the UNSC to formulate 
more and more ambitious mandates regarding the use of force. This 
trends faces several challenges, one of the most important being the lack 
of cause-effect relation between the increased use of force and better re-
sults in terms of protecting civilians or protecting forces. Brazil opines 
that although led by good intentions, military operations can have dev-
astating humanitarian effects on the civilian population. In fact, the use 
of force always brings with itself the risk of collateral damage and of 
spreading violence and instability. Moreover, it is not correct to affirm 
that the more intensive use of force has a positive relation with a more 
effective political process. Rather, use of force risks compromising UN’s 
impartiality as it undermines the organization’s ability to mediate and to 
promote a political solution. It also leads to the mistaken idea that the 
UN would or should be able to impose a military solution to the conflict. 
On the one hand, the use of force may be essential to create some stabil-
ity, but on the other, it cannot be inferred that it will lead to building the 
                                                          
25  Fonseca Jr, G. (2010). “Dever de proteger ou nova forma de intervencionismo?”, in 
Jobim, Etchegoyen and Alsina (eds.) “Segurança Internacional: perspectivas bra-
sileiras”. Rio de Janeiro: FGV. 
26  Fontoura (2005), op.cit. 
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needed consensus for national reconciliation or for achieving a political 
solution to the conflict.27 
At the tactical level, Brazil’s position regarding the use of force is 
aligned with the Capstone Doctrine, which imposes limits but also pro-
vides a margin of manoeuvre to use force within rules of engagement 
that basically reflect International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law. Brazilian contingents have used force in self-de-
fence and in the defines of the mandate in numerous times, within the 
rules of engagement and the directives for using force in the mission 
area. This was true in MINUSTAH, particularly in the initial years (2004-
2007).28  
a. To conclude, the points expressed by Brazil in multiple fora 
provide a good insight into the policy stand. The key issues 
are: 
b. Treat issues related to both security and development sim-
ultaneously in conflict and post-conflict situations; 
c. Criticizes the securitization of the UN regular budget, at the 
expense of investments in development and human rights;  
d. Expresses reservations about the use of force by peacekeep-
ers; and  
e. Important for the UNSC to consult T/PCCs and take their 
views into account, especially on decisions related to 
changes in the mandates and in processes of troop with-
drawal. 
 
                                                          
27  Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
28  CCOPAB. 
China29 
China ranks ninth among the 124 T/PCCs (TPCC) and number one 
among the five United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent 
members in terms of the contribution of personnel. As of December 
2015, China has 3045 peacekeepers, including 2839 troops, 37 UN Mil-
itary Experts on Mission (UNMEM) and 169 police officers, in 10 of the 
16 ongoing UN PKOs, which represented about three percent out of a 
total of 107,088 uniformed peacekeepers in all the UN-commanded 
PKOs.30 So far China has contributed a total of about 30,000 military and 
police peacekeepers to the UN-commanded PKO and political missions. 
In December 2013, China for the first time deployed a security company 
to a UN PKO, the United Nations Multi-Dimensional Integrated Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In September 2014, China announced 
that it had agreed to contribute a 700-person infantry battalion to the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMSS).31 
China’s increasingly active participation in UN peacekeeping is also 
reflected in its increasing financial contributions, huge investment in 
building training capabilities and increasingly active participation in in-
ternational conflict management in and outside of the UN peacekeeping 
system. China’s share of the UN peacekeeping budget had increased 
from about 0.995 percent in 2000 to 10.5 percent in 2016.  
China has also greatly enhanced its peacekeeping training capabili-
ties. Both the Chinese military and police forces have established their 
own peacekeeping training centres.32  The Chinese government has in-
vested heavily in setting up training facilities for these two training cen-
tres, which serve as venues not only for training of Chinese peacekeep-
ing personnel, but also for international cooperation activities. Both 
                                                          
29  The country study of China was undertaken by Dr. He Yin of the China Peacekeeping 
Police Training Centre. 
30  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2015/dec15_2.pdf. Accessed 
on 14 Feb 2016. 
31  “China to Send 700 Peacekeepers to South Sudan for UN Mission: Defence Minis-
try,” Xinhua, September 25, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-
lish/china/2014-09/25/c_133672485.htm. (Accessed on 21 November 2015). 
32  In August 2000, the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center was established, 
which is located in Langfang, Heibei Province and later renamed as the China Peace-
keeping Police Training Center (CPPTC). In 2009, the Chinese military established the 
MOD Peacekeeping Training Center, which is located in Huairou, Beijing Municipal 
City. 
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these training centres hold international training courses and host inter-
national academic activities, attracting participants from around the 
world.33 
 China is becoming increasingly active in participating in interna-
tional affairs regarding peace and security. It has nominated special rep-
resentatives for regions like Africa and Middle East. Beijing was believed 
to have played an important role in persuading Sudan to accept UN 
peacekeeping in 2006.34  Working together with their international col-
leagues including those from the U.S. and Europe, the Chinese special 
representatives and Minister of Foreign Affairs have made significant 
contribution to the peace process in many conflicts, such as South Su-
dan, Darfur in Sudan, the eastern part of the DRC, Mali, Afghanistan and 
the Middle East.35 China has given strong support to the UNSC Resolu-
tion 1816, which calls for international efforts to fight pirate activities in 
the Gulf of Aden. It has deployed ships to conduct escort missions in in-
ternational waters of that region since 2008. On January 4, 2014, China 
sent the frigate “Yancheng” to join the international escort mission for 
the disposal of Syrian chemical weapons in response to the appeals from 
the UNSC and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW).36 
Most significantly, on September 28, 2015, in his statement at the 
General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly and re-
marks at the UN Peacekeeping Summit respectively, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping announced six important measures to support the improve-
ment and strengthening of UN PKOs, namely: 
a. China will join the new UN peacekeeping Capability Readiness Sys-
tem and set up a permanent peacekeeping police squad and build a 
peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops; 
b. It will give favourable consideration to UN requests for more Chinese 
engineering soldiers and transportation and medical staff to take part 
in UN PKOs; 
                                                          
33  In 2014 alone, China has hosted two important international academic events on 
peacekeeping, one is the Strategic Guideline Framework Seminar, co-hosted by the 
MPS with the DPKO in June 2014 in the CPPTC, another the Challenges 2014 Annual 
Forum, co-hosted by the MOD Peacekeeping Affairs Office and China International 
Strategic Institute with the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy in October 2014 in 
the MOD Peacekeeping Training Center. 
34  International Crisis Group, “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping” (ICG: Beijing, 
New York and Brussels, 2009), Asia Report, No.166, pp 19-22. 
35  Interview with official from the MFA, June 18, 2014, Beijing. 
36  “Chinese Frigate Starts Escort Mission for Chemical Weapons: FM,” Xinhua, January 
08, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
01/08/c_133026228.htm. (Accessed on 21 November 2015). 
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c. In the coming five years, China will train 2,000 peacekeepers from 
other countries, and carry out 10 demining assistance programs which 
will include training and equipment provision; 
a. Also, in the coming five years, China will provide free military aid 
of US$100 million to the African Union to support the building 
of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Imme-
diate Response to Crisis; 
b. China will send the first peacekeeping helicopter squad to UN 
PKOs in Africa, and 
c. It will establish a 10-year, US$1 billion China-UN peace and de-
velopment fund to support the UN’s work, advance multilateral 
cooperation and contribute more to world peace and develop-
ment. Part of the fund will be used to support UN PKOs.37 
China responded enthusiastically to the recently published Report of the 
High-Level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and decided to 
take a lead in giving strong support to the UN peacekeeping at this his-
toric time, and to help promote UN peace operations in the coming years. 
Some believe that China’s current policy of increasingly active participa-
tion in UN peacekeeping is driven by a long list of pragmatic needs or 
interests ranging from “multilateralism and image building to more tra-
ditional concerns such as isolating Taiwan and securing its invest-
ments”.38 The Chinese Government contest this. Some point to South Su-
dan and argue that China’s participation in UN peacekeeping is driven 
by its increasing needs for natural resources like oil.39 However, the Chi-
nese Government state that this kind of argument is questionable be-
cause China has also deployed many troops to UN PKOs in places like 
Darfur, Mali, Lebanon and Haiti, where there are not many natural re-
                                                          
37 Xi Jinping, “Working together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperations 
and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” Statement by H.E. Xi 
Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China at the General Debate of the 
70th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 28 September 2015, 
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38  Bates Gill and Huang Chin-Hao, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects 
and Policy Implications” (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute, 2009), SIPRI Policy Paper 25, p 11. 
39  Colum Lynch, “U.N. Peacekeepers to Protect China’s Oil Interests in South Sudan”, 
The Cable, 16 June, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/16/u-n-peacekeep-
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sources. Others argue that Beijing’s One-China policy is a key factor af-
fecting its peacekeeping behaviour.40 The Chinese Government argue 
that it has shown, through its support to the UN peacekeeping efforts in 
Haiti, which has long adopted a pro-Taiwan policy, that Beijing has a 
peacekeeping strategy beyond the “Taiwan Question”.  
Since 1971 China’s national identity has undergone three phases of 
development, and so has its doctrine on UN peacekeeping. In the 1970s, 
China was largely revolutionist in its outlook, which meant that it kept a 
sceptical eye on the existing international order and institutions. As a 
result, it condemned and opposed the creation and continuation of all 
UN PKOs, refused to burden its annual budget with peacekeeping or con-
tribute personnel to ongoing operations, and abstained from UNSC vot-
ing. In a way, in the 1970s, China isolated itself outside the UN peace-
keeping regime.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, China began to selectively accept UN peace-
keeping. Being a veto-wielding permanent member in the UNSC, China 
found that its policy on UN peacekeeping, if well designed, could gener-
ate precious political capital for its integration into the international 
community. As a result, Beijing gradually accepted the concept of UN 
peacekeeping. China’s peacekeeping doctrine in 1980s and 1990s 
largely reflected a balance between its traditional normative position 
and pragmatic concerns for its national interests, in particular, those re-
garding its strategy of being a normal member of the international com-
munity. 
China is a rising power in the 21st century and it has a peacekeeping 
doctrine that is increasingly aligned with other member states. China’s 
new identity of a rising power defines its interests in peacekeeping and 
shapes its peacekeeping doctrine. UN peacekeeping has three guiding 
principles – consent, impartiality and non-use of force, which China be-
lieves are “fundamental to winning the confidence and support of Mem-
ber States for peacekeeping operations and ensuring their smooth con-
duct”.41  Although, China still insists that peacekeeping should adhere 
to these three principles, there have been some shifts in its position.  
China insists that consent of a host country is a prerequisite to estab-
lishing a UN PKO. This stance is in concord with its traditional position 
on Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and non-interference. If a 
host country has consented to accept peacekeeping, Beijing will usually 
not only show its support to the UNSC resolution that authorizes a PKO, 
but also contribute peacekeepers to participate in the PKO. China is also 
                                                          
40  International Crisis Group, “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping”, p 17. 
41  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on the UN Security Council’s 
Vote on the Draft Resolution to Refer the Situation in Syria to the International Crimi-
nal Court”, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 May 23 2014, 
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aware that sometimes consent may not come voluntarily; instead, it has 
to be obtained through efforts. However, Beijing is against the use or 
threat of sanctions and force; it prefers non-coercive means like persua-
sion and influence. China is believed to have joined the international 
community to persuade Sudan, South Sudan, the DRC Congo and Syria 
to accept UN peacekeeping or cooperate with the UN in recent years.42 
China also insists that the principle of impartiality should be abided 
by in peace efforts of the international community: “[T]he international 
community should adhere to the principle of ‘impartiality, objectiveness 
and neutrality’ … refrain from interfering in local political disputes or 
impeding the peace process”.43  Ambassador Wang Min warned:  
“Any practice that deviates from or weakens [the guiding principles 
of peacekeeping] will hamper the operation’s impartiality and objec-
tivity and, worse yet, could transform the United Nations into a party 
to conflict, thereby undermining the conflict resolution efforts of the 
international community”.44 
China maintains that peaceful settlement of international disputes and 
non-use of force in international relations is an important principle of 
the UN Charter and a basic norm of international law. It opposes the 
threat or use of force in international relations.45  Nevertheless, Beijing 
does not rule out the necessity of using force in peacekeeping under 
some circumstances. It insists that the use of force should meet two basic 
requirements: one is the authorization of the UNSC, the other is that 
force should only be used for self-defence or defence of the mandate. 
Moreover, it advocates that the decision on whether to use force or not 
should be decided by the UNSC in light of the reality of conflicts on a 
case-by-case basis”.46  China’s contribution of a 135-person security 
company and a 700-person infantry battalion to MINUSM and UNMISS 
respectively shows that although in the 21st century the rising power 
still has concerns regarding the use of force, it does not mind being di-
rectly engaged in use of force in UN-commanded PKOs anymore.  
China’s position on the above-mentioned three guiding principles is 
also well reflected in its attitude towards R2P. Although Beijing has in 
principle endorsed R2P by supporting the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 
                                                          
42  Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat, June 18, 2014, Beijing. 
43  “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China at the 68th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly”, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 September 2013, 
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46  Ibid. 
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it has never accepted the interventionism embodied in the doctrine. Ac-
cording to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, R2P has three pillars: 
Pillar One: Each individual state has a responsibility to protect its 
population from mass atrocities. 
Pillar Two: The international community has a responsibility to assist 
the state to protect its population. 
Pillar Three: If the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities 
and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has 
the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures. But mili-
tary intervention is the last resort.47 
China insists that most of the weight of R2P should fall on “Pillar One”. 
It is concerned that R2P may serve as a sharp tool for the West, who pre-
fers “Pillar Two” and “Pillar Three” of R2P, to skip the consent of host 
countries and penetrate the wall of traditional sovereignty.48 According 
to one Chinese ex-diplomat, Chinese Government regards R2P as a con-
cept or a good wish, which simply has significance of political morality. 
Nevertheless, China has not adopted a rigid policy on R2P which rules 
out international intervention under any circumstances. It does recog-
nize that the concept of R2P can apply for international crimes of “gen-
ocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity”.49  
One major concern of the supporters of R2P is about protection of ci-
vilians (PoC). As is shown in China’s support to the UN guiding principle 
of use of force, which makes it clear that force can be used as the last 
resort in implementation of a PKO mandate authorized by the UNSC ac-
cording to the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, China basically agrees to 
the concept of PoC. In a statement at a UNSC open debate on PoC in 
armed conflict, Ambassador Wang Min said: 
“[W]hen considering a protection-of-civilians mandate for a peace-
keeping operation, it is crucial to respect fundamental principles, 
such as the consent of host countries …[peacekeeping operations] 
should … respect the sovereignty of the host country, ensure objectiv-
ity and impartiality and avoid becoming a party to the conflict”.50 
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49  Statement by Ambassador Liu Zhenmin at the Plenary Session of the General As-
sembly on the Question of Responsibility to Protect”, Permanent Mission of the 
People’s Republic of China to the UN, 24 July 2009, www.china-
un.org/eng/hyyfy/t575682.htm. (Accessed on 21 November 2015). 
50  “Statement by Ambassador Wang Min at the Security Council Open Debate on Pro-
tection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic 
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In recent years, the Chinese academic community has also begun to dis-
cuss R2P. In 2012 one Chinese academic Ruan Zongze coined a concept 
“responsible protection (RP)” to balance the interventionist elements, 
most notably, Pillar Three, of R2P. Some regard RP as the Chinese initi-
ative of protection vis á vis R2P. The greatest significance of RP is not 
how it differs from R2P, but that it symbolizes a turn of China’s attitude 
towards international norms, from passive acceptance or rigid rejection 
in the past to increasingly active participation in debate.  
The People's Liberation Army (PLA’s) increasingly active participa-
tion in non-military missions both domestically and internationally in 
the 21st century urged China to re-define the PLA’s missions as military 
operations and military operations other than war (MOATW). In January 
2009, the MOD issued The Planning on Capacity Building of PLA’s Mili-
tary Operations other than War, which defined clear guidelines, princi-
ples, objectives, force scale as well as measures and requirements on the 
PLA’s capacity building of MOATW. In December 2011, The Military Op-
erations Other Than War Research Center has also been established at 
the Academy of Military Sciences. 
In March 2013, the MOD issued white paper called The Diversified 
Employment of China’s Armed Forces, which for the first time systemat-
ically explained the PLA’s missions in the 21st century.51 According to 
the white paper, the PLA has diversified missions including defending 
national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, supporting na-
tional economic and social development and safeguarding world peace 
and regional stability. Most notably, it goes in-depth to explain the PLA’s 
MOATW missions including participating in UN peacekeeping, promis-
ing that the PLA “conscientiously assume their due international re-
sponsibilities; and play an active role in maintaining world peace, secu-
rity and stability.”52 Regarding the legal issues of the PLA’s MOATW, the 
white paper reads: 
“On the basis of the UN Charter and other universally recognized 
norms of international relations, they [the PLA] consistently operate 
within the legal framework formed by bilateral or multi-lateral trea-
ties and agreements, so as to ensure the legitimacy of their operations 
involving foreign countries or militaries.” 
At the operational level, the PLA’s deployment of a security company to 
Mali and an infantry battalion to South Sudan shows that the Chinese 
military forces are willing to carry on security tasks in UN peacekeeping 
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and when necessary, the PLA peacekeepers will not mind using force. 
On 25 September 2104, MOD spokesperson Geng Yansheng said on a 
press conference: 
“The United Nations’ Security Council resolution authorizes the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan to take the protection of civil-
ians, UN employees and humanitarian workers as one of its main 
tasks. The Chinese peacekeeping troops will strictly abide by the in-
ternational law and stick to their mandate. They will provide protec-
tion to the local people and other countries’ personnel engaged in 
such peaceful activities as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance 
and economic development in the area to the best of their ability. And 
their actions will be taken as required by the situation, or upon the 
instruction from the headquarters of the mission, and they will also 
follow the rule of engagement.”53 
Nevertheless, the spokesperson also emphasized that it is not accurate 
to call the Chinese peacekeeping infantry battalion to South Sudan 
“combat troops”. He stated “The peacekeeping infantry battalion, called 
security troops by the UN, is tasked to implement security and protec-
tion, rather than to carry out traditional combat tasks…[t]he UN peace-
keeping troops will not get directly involved in the armed conflicts of the 
mission country.”54 
China is a rising power in the 21st century. Backed with enhanced na-
tional strength, improved international status and accumulated 
knowledge about the international community, including UN peace-
keeping, China is increasingly aware of its rights and responsibilities as 
a rising power. China is evolving a peacekeeping doctrine in concert with 
its strategy of peaceful rising. The peacekeeping doctrine should serve 
China’s strategic interests of being a responsible power and building a 
peaceful international environment. Therefore, it is playing an active or 
sometimes even proactive role in UN peacekeeping. China’s peacekeep-
ing doctrine in the 21st century can be characterized as “active participa-
tion”. The PLA’s increasingly recent deployment of security troops to Af-
rica in particular, shows that at the operational level, the PLA is willing 
to accept protection tasks in UN-commanded PKOs. When necessary, the 
PLA peacekeepers will not mind using force for self-defence or defence 
of their mandate.  
UN peacekeeping is at a crossroad where the traditional principles of 
peacekeeping are faced with challenges of post-Westphalian norms of 
limited state sovereignty and interventionism. As an active participant 
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of UN peacekeeping as well as a rising power, China has its own distinct 
peacekeeping doctrine. 
 
Egypt55 
Egypt is a founding member of the United Nations (UN), the League of 
Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and is a 
regional power in both the Arab World and Africa. Egypt is currently 
(2016-2017) a non-permanent member of the Security Council and the 
AU’s Peace and Security Council. Egypt views peacekeeping as the UN’s 
most potent instrument for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. UN peacekeeping from an Egyptian point of view is a “cost-ef-
fective means of averting conflicts” and “a genuine expression of the 
principle of collective security”.56  
Egypt has had a long history of association with UN peacekeeping. 
While the first UN peacekeeping mission was the Truce Supervision Or-
ganization (UNTSO) in 1948 that monitored the Armistice Agreement 
with Israel, the first armed peacekeeping mission was the First UN Emer-
gency Force (UNEF-I). UNEF-I was deployed in 1956 to Egypt’s Sinai 
Peninsula to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including 
the withdrawal of the armed forces of the United Kingdom, France, and 
Israel from Egyptian territory and to act thereafter as a buffer between 
Egyptian and Israeli forces. But the country’s initial contribution was to 
UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) in 1960, the first UN multidimensional 
mission with a complex and large mandate.  However, it was three dec-
ades later – in 1991 – that Egypt began its uninterrupted contribution to 
UN peacekeeping, with UNAVEM II (Angola) and MINURSO (Western Sa-
hara) in 1991.     
Over all, Egypt has contributed to 37 UN peacekeeping missions, with 
more than 30,000 peacekeepers deployed in 24 countries in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and Europe.  Today, Egyptian peacekeepers serve in 8 of 
the 16 active UN missions worldwide, namely in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO), the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), 
Congo (MONUSCO), Darfur (UNAMID), Liberia (UNMIL), South Sudan 
(UNMISS), and Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI).   
During the period 2000-2005, Egyptian contribution to UN peace-
keeping missions remained more or less stagnant at a low level. In the 
following year, the contribution, more than tripled from 301 in 2005 to 
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916 in 2006. The upward swing in Egyptian contributions, driven pri-
marily by the surge in UN demand for peacekeepers, continued uninter-
rupted throughout the rest of the decade, reaching its peak of more than 
5,000 peacekeepers in 2010. From that point onwards, Egyptian contri-
bution started to decline until this very day reaching their current levels 
of 2809 uniformed personnel as o 31 Dec 15.57 
A review of the available data indicates a clear preference for partici-
pation under the UN helmet. With the exception of Egypt’s contribution 
to the International Force/Stability Force (IFOR/SFOR), its participation 
in non-UN missions has been both limited in numbers and predomi-
nantly in the form of staff officers and military experts.  
In his statement before the Summit on Strengthening UN Peacekeep-
ing Operations, on the margins of the 69th Session of the General Assem-
bly of the UN, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry announced 
Egypt’s readiness to increase its contributions to UN peacekeeping. He 
expressed Egypt’s willingness to deploy additional infantry troops and 
enabling units, including capabilities for rapid response, to current and 
newly established missions. He also expressed Egypt’s interest in joining 
the UN Formed Police Units Standby Capacity, and contributing with 
more Formed Police Units.58  
Egypt ranks as the 13th among T/PCC’s as of 31 December 2015, with 
a total of 2809 personnel, whereas it ranked the 17th in June 2015 (2059 
personnel). The surge in the Egyptian participation in UN peacekeeping 
indicates Egypt’s commitment to turning those pledges into contribu-
tions.59 Egypt has pledged increasing its contribution to peacekeeping 
before, during and after the 2015 Leaders’ Peacekeeping Summit. Some 
of those pledges have already materialized or are in the process of mate-
rialization. Egypt has deployed a mechanized infantry battalion in Cen-
tral African Republic (MINUSCA), with a total of 750 personnel. The 
country is deploying a Formed Police Unit (FPU) to the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (MONUSCO) in February 2016, with a total of 180 per-
sonnel, that’s in addition to the current 140 personnel. It is also deploy-
ing a Formed Police Unit (FPU) to Mali (MINUSMA) with a total of 140 
personnel. 
A number of rationales drive Egypt’s contribution to UN peacekeep-
ing. Together they form a set of diverse, yet coherently linked, strategic 
and political interests. Strategically, Egypt sees its active participation 
                                                          
57   UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeep-
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58  Statement by Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Summit on Strengthening UN 
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in peacekeeping missions, especially in Africa, as a means of contrib-
uting to international peace and security. This is particularly true of 
Egypt’s participation in its immediate neighbourhood (Sudan, for exam-
ple), where Egyptian participation is seen as a means of preventing a 
spill over effect. It is equally true of regions considered as priority areas 
from an Egyptian national security point of view, most notably the Nile 
Basin, Great Lakes, and most recently the Sahel and Sahara region, es-
pecially following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011.  
Politically and normatively, Egypt maintains a self-image of a leader 
in its neighbourhood and a champion of multilateralism based on a 
strong UN and the purposes and principles of its Charter. In this regard, 
active participation in peacekeeping, together with Egypt’s consistent 
efforts in areas of conflict resolution, peacemaking, post-conflict recon-
struction and peacebuilding60 in Africa, the Arab world and beyond, ex-
emplify the country’s leadership and commitment.  
Accompanying that sense of responsibility, comes a legitimate claim 
to recognition, international prestige and most importantly authority, as 
demonstrated by Egypt’s keen interest in being a norm and agenda-set-
ter, rather than a norm and agenda-taker, particularly globally. Egypt’s 
current membership of the UN Security Council and the AU’s Peace and 
Security Council falls within the same logic.  
Egypt’s approach and contribution to the issues on peacekeeping be-
ing debated recently has been consistent over the years and in conform-
ity with the long-held stances of its foreign policy. On the one hand, as a 
founding member of the UN, LAS, OAU, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Egypt has 
been a champion of multilateralism and collective action, based on a 
strong UN.61 Egypt places great emphasis on the unmatched legitimacy 
and credibility that distinguishes the UN as an actor in the field of inter-
national peace and security. On the other hand, Egypt has also been a 
leading voice in defence of state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
the principle of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs.  
Egypt insists on the exclusive use of the term peacekeeping for such 
UN operations. Most recently, and as a response to the recommendations 
of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations62, Egypt 
                                                          
60  Egypt has actively supported the UN peacebuilding architecture since the adoption 
of the General Assembly of Resolution 60/180 and the establishment of the Peace-
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http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf. Last accessed on Au-
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has shown some flexibility regarding the use of the term “peace opera-
tions” as long as it is used exclusively in reference to peacekeeping and 
special political missions. Whether the term is peacekeeping missions or 
peace operation, the Egyptian emphasis is on the consent-based nature 
of UN peacekeeping built around the understanding that peacekeeping 
does not itself deliver peace, but that it is rather an enabler of an ongoing 
peace process.   
Egypt questions the use of terms such as “peace support operations” 
and “peace enforcement”, when used in a way that may confuse these 
operations with peacekeeping operations. Egypt views these concepts, 
and their coercive nature, as a departure from the consent-based ap-
proach of peacekeeping, especially in light of the continued lack of a 
clear and agreed upon definition for them. Egypt has gone as far as 
openly expressing concerns about what it regards as a deliberate attempt 
to blur the lines between these concepts and peacekeeping, which it be-
lieves would eventually undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the 
UN as an institution, and of peacekeeping as a tool for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.   
Consistent with the above are Egypt’s views on the enshrined princi-
ples of peacekeeping, namely consent of the parties, impartiality, and 
the non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. 
From an Egyptian point of view63, lack of consent of the main parties to 
the conflict undermines the mission, puts the lives of its personnel at 
risk, and limits its political and physical freedom of action, hence jeop-
ardising the mission’s chances of success. Egypt equally stresses the im-
portance of impartiality for the success of peacekeeping. Taking sides – 
or even the appearance of it – would risk making the peacekeeping mis-
sion a party to the conflict. Egypt also views the use of force in a peace-
keeping mission as a last resort, not as an enforcement mechanism.64 
However, Egypt’s position concerning the principles of peacekeeping 
is a dynamic one. On the one hand, there is a recognition that the ever-
growing complexity of the modern peacekeeping environment necessi-
tates adaptability, yet one that does not dilute the principles or under-
mine the efficacy of peacekeeping by blurring the lines with other con-
cepts. On the other hand, there is also an acknowledgement that the way 
these fundamental principles of peacekeeping play out in practice is far 
from self-evident.  
Egypt's contribution to peacekeeping missions goes hand in hand 
with an active role in doctrinal development and policymaking. Egypt 
has been a vocal participant in various international peacekeeping fora. 
Most notably, Egypt has been the rapporteur of the Special Committee 
on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) since 1966. In general, Egypt stresses 
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that the development of concepts, policies and strategies must be done 
at the intergovernmental level, and that only ideas and approaches that 
have been adopted by member states collectively would be imple-
mented. Egypt also insists that the C34 is the only body entitled to re-
viewing UN Peacekeeping Operations in all its aspects. 
Egypt has consistently advocated a comprehensive approach to the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts.65 Within that framework, Egypt views 
peacekeeping as an important component of a larger strategy that 
equally stresses the pivotal role of conflict prevention and mediation 
through early warning, good offices and similar endeavours, as well as 
post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.66 It is no surprise there-
fore that Egypt has welcomed the emphasis placed by the High-Level In-
dependent Panel on UN Peace Operations on the “primacy of politics”.67  
In the same token, Egypt has been a consistent advocate of the devel-
opment-security nexus and of a better integration of peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding activities. In the pursuit of lasting peace and to prevent 
relapse to conflict, Egypt views both sets of activities as overlapping and 
mutually-reinforcing,68 not as two phases of a consequential process.   
Consistent with its position on all issues of peacekeeping, Egypt em-
phasises the absolute necessity of respecting state sovereignty and na-
tional ownership. Egypt therefore insists that all activities aimed at 
building national capacities and developing the linkage between peace 
and development must be in accordance with the host country’s strate-
gies and priorities.  
Egypt has consistently been a promoter of realistic and achievable 
mandates, based upon an objective assessment of needs. Egypt also em-
phasises the importance of fully and carefully considering the availabil-
ity of resources69 to achieve the link between policy formulation and im-
plementation on the ground. It is of the view that the mandate design 
should be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter, especially respect of state sovereignty and host-nation owner-
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ship. The UN should avoid creating mandates that lack the necessary po-
litical support. Mandates should also conform to the enshrined princi-
ples of peacekeeping.   
Egypt highlighted its stance on the recommendations of HIPPO Panel 
during the General Assembly debate held on 12 October 2015. Egypt en-
dorsed the Panel’s call for a renewed focus on prevention, but high-
lighted that early prevention shouldn’t be used as a backdoor for inter-
vening in other states affairs. Egypt also underlined the importance of 
upholding peacekeeping principles and establishing concrete mecha-
nisms between the Security Council and regional and sub-regional ac-
tors to strengthen global-regional partnerships.70 
Moreover, and as a top T/PCC, Egypt has been at the forefront of calls 
for the full participation of T/PCCs, together with the Security Council 
and the UN Secretariat, in doctrinal development, policy formulation 
and mandates design and extension. Egypt sees this triangle as the only 
guarantee of realistic and feasible mandates, and as a means of achiev-
ing the aspired partnership and required effectiveness for the activities 
of the UN peacekeeping.71 Changes to the mandates of peacekeeping 
missions should be preceded by consultations with troop-contributing 
countries and securing their consent for any change. 
Egypt’s position with regards to protection of civilians (POC) reso-
nates with its position on other concepts, most notably the Responsibil-
ity to Protect (R2P). It views R2P as a political term in need of further 
deliberations and clarification to bring it to conformity with the UN Char-
ter and relevant principles of international law. Egypt also insists that 
the only negotiated document that includes the concept R2P is the World 
Summit Outcome Document, and that any further steps on R2P, includ-
ing the interpretation of the concept, should be based on the acceptance 
of the general membership of the UN72. Egypt has also explicitly ex-
pressed concern about using R2P “as a back door for disguised military 
intervention”73.    
It is no surprise therefore that Egypt’s position on the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict is one of placing emphasis on the role of 
peacekeeping in support of national efforts in this regard. The primary 
                                                          
70  "To Strengthen United Nations Peace Operations, General Assembly Urges Replac-
ing Template Approaches with Targeted Efforts, Tailored Mandates, Focus on Dia-
logue | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." UN News Center. Accessed Novem-
ber 12, 2015. http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11703.doc.htm. 
71  Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations, “The Fourth Committee Compre-
hensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their As-
pects”, United Nations, New York, October 26, 2011. 
72  Statement of Egypt at the “Informal Interactive Dialogue of the General Assembly on 
the Responsibility to Protect”, September 11, 2013. 
73  Ibid.  
Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report. Rising Powers and Peace Operations 35 
responsibility for the protection of civilians rests with the state and par-
ties to the conflict, in accordance with the purposes of the Charter and 
the enshrined principles of peacekeeping.  
Egypt highlights that POC in peacekeeping missions, must be man-
dated, and must be limited to the cases of an imminent and direct threat 
to civilian populations. It should not be used as a pretext for military in-
tervention by the UN in conflicts, nor as diluting the concept and prac-
tice of impartiality vis-à-vis the parties of any specific conflict74. Egypt 
also highlights the legal difficulties related to the characterization of ci-
vilians in armed conflicts as combatants, especially in conflicts that have 
armed civilian parties75. Finally, Egypt stresses the need for improving 
the process of planning, most notably improving the consultative pro-
cess between the Security Council and troop contributing countries and 
securing the necessary resources to enable the mission to carry out its 
POC mandate.   
In general, Egypt maintains that the use of force should be as a meas-
ure of last resort and that it must be minimal, calibrated, proportional, 
and in conformity with rules of engagement and international humani-
tarian law, used in self-defence or in the defence of the mandate. Egypt 
has also been among the countries – mostly emerging powers and 
T/PCCs – that view the growing robustness of UN peacekeeping with 
concern, regarding definition, scope and applicability. On the one hand, 
there is a worry that the growing robustness of peacekeeping missions 
would dilute or compromise the core principles of UN peacekeeping76, 
turning the mission into a party to the conflict, and in the process under-
mining faith in the UN. On the other hand, adaptability to the changing 
environment and new and emerging threats, challenges and risks must 
be weighed against the operational implications for missions in the field 
from the growing resort to force.    
Egypt is a supporter of a more prominent role for regional organiza-
tions in the maintenance of peace and security, and of a closer coopera-
tion with the UN in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. This co-
vers the full spectrum of peace efforts, including peacemaking, peace-
keeping and peacebuilding. Egypt also maintains that the UN – as the 
organization with the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security – has a crucial role to play in support of 
regional organizations, politically, financially, logistically and in the 
field of capacity building. 
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Egypt recognises “the pivotal role of women in the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts and in peace-building as outlined in the Security 
Council Resolution 1325.77 It has joined the International Declaration of 
Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict. Egypt has reiterated its 
support for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on the 15th anni-
versary of the adoption of the landmark resolution on “Women, Peace 
and Security,” and announced its backing for the United Nations Secre-
tary General’s recent call to strengthen the role of women within the 
framework of UN peacekeeping operations. Several high-ranking Egyp-
tian officials have made it clear that the implementation of UNSCR 1325 
remains a priority for Egypt as it is consistent with the country’s vision 
to enable women on all levels. This has culminated in concrete efforts, 
as the Egyptian National Council for Women has put forth a national 
plan to follow-up on the implementation of UNSCR 1325.78 Nonetheless, 
Egypt sees that UNSCR 1325 lacks key components and ignores im-
portant aspects that are necessary to empowering women while taking 
issues such as control and confidentiality of collected information into 
consideration within the current global context. The Egyptian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shourky, recently highlighted that the UNSCR 
1325, in its current form, fails to give attention to “the suffering of 
women under foreign occupation” and ignores the “consequences of 
linking international human rights law with international humanitarian 
law” which has led to the politicisation of initiatives undertaken under 
the guise of “women, peace and security.79” Shoukry has also been firm 
in stressing that “national sovereignty considerations” were ignored 
while implementing the resolution and that “informal and inaccurate” 
information have been utilised to evaluate the impact of projects pertain-
ing to the “women, peace and security agenda.”  
On the issue of use of new technologies, Egypt has been among a 
group of countries calling for a thorough examination of utilising high-
technology equipment in peacekeeping operations, and the political, le-
gal and financial ramifications of doing so.  
With regards to funding and mission support, Egypt is of the view that 
peacekeeping missions should have predictable and sustainable re-
sources, be it financial, human or logistical, to implement their man-
dates. While providing these resources is the responsibility of all Mem-
                                                          
77  Statement of Egypt before the “Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace, and 
Security”, New York, October, 2013. 
78  “Statement by Minister Sameh Shoukry, Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, In the debate session held by the Spanish Presidency on the occasion of the 
ongoing review of Security Council Resolution 1325.” Egyptian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Published on 15 October 2015. Accessible online: 
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Minis-
try/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e-
ee26ce851de8&newsID=c75dfb10-9c71-4115-9704-97418fa64260 
79  Ibid. 
Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report. Rising Powers and Peace Operations 37 
ber States, developed countries should shoulder a larger burden, espe-
cially in providing funding and critical resources, such as strategic lift, 
technology, training and capacity building.    
Egypt on its part has invested in training and capacity building. The 
Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) 
– plays an intrinsic role in training Egyptian and African peacekeepers. 
In addition to pre-deployment training of Egyptian peacekeepers, 
CCCPA offers integrated multidimensional training in issues of conflict 
resolution, crisis management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The 
Center has expanded its thematic areas of focus recently to include deal-
ing with transnational threats, such as human trafficking and counter-
ing the illicit trade in light arms and small weapons (SALW). 
 
 
India80  
Even before India’s independence in 1947, Ms Vijayalaksmi Pandit, 
leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly’s 
first session in New York (October-December 1946) pledged commit-
ment to the principles of peace and justice as enshrined in the UN Char-
ter.81 As a founding member of the United Nations, India strongly sup-
ports the purpose and principles of the United Nations. It has been her 
endeavour to make significant contributions towards implementing the 
goals of the UN Charter and to the UN’s specialised programmes and 
agencies.  
With the increased commitment in peacekeeping of the UN in the 
post-Cold War era, India has continued to provide commanders, armed 
military contingents, military observers, and staff officers, as also Indian 
Air Force attack and utility helicopters, to many of the UN missions de-
ployed to keep the peace in various parts of the world. India’s contribu-
tions include Korea 1950-1954, Indo-China in 1954-1970, Middle East 
1956-1967, Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964 with Brigade Group and Air 
Force, Iran and Iraq in 1988/90 after the bloody conflict in the region; 
on the Iraqi-Kuwait border after the Gulf War in 1991; Angola in 
1989/91, and again in 1995/99; Central America in 1990/92; El Salva-
dor in 1991; Cambodia 1992/93; Mozambique 1992/94, Liberia in 
1993; Somalia (1993–94) (UNITAF & UNOSOM II) with a Brigade Group 
composed of 5000 personnel from the Indian Army and four battleships 
from the Indian navy82; Rwanda in 1994/96; Sierra Leone in 
1998/2001; Lebanon from 1998 to date; Ethiopia-Eritrea in 2001/2009; 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1999 to date; Cote d’Ivoire 
from 2003 to date, Burundi in 2003/2006; Sudan/South Sudan from 
2005 to date, and the Golan Heights from 2006 to date.  
India has also provided police personnel to a number of United Na-
tions missions such as in Namibia, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Haiti, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Congo, and in Liberia (where 
it has created history by providing all-women formed police units that 
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has drawn acclaim locally as well as internationally83) and in Su-
dan/South Sudan.    
India has to date (31 Dec 2015) contributed nearly 180,000 troops, 
in more than 44 missions and has suffered 159 Indian peacekeepers fa-
talities the largest number from any country, while serving in UN mis-
sions.84 India currently (as on 31 Dec 15) contributes 7798 troops, mili-
tary observers and staff officers and police personnel in 12 of the 16 cur-
rent UN peace operations. India’s major deployments are 4022 person-
nel with MONUSCO in the DR Congo, 2187 personnel with UNMISS in 
South Sudan, 898 military personnel with UNIFIL in Lebanon; and a 
contingent of 191 personnel with UNDOF in the Golan Heights.  As the 
third largest contributor of troops and police personnel to the UN peace-
keeping, India provides 7.6 per cent of the total contributions of all the 
T/PCCs.  
As an emerging power, India’s participation in UN peacekeeping mis-
sions represents an ideal opportunity to project India as a responsible 
and conscientious nation with non-aligned credentials. India aspires to 
be recognised as a great power that has influence on the world stage, 
and has aspiration of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council. 
Compared to many other troop contributing countries from develop-
ing countries, India has a better economic status and comfortable levels 
of foreign exchange reserves. With vibrant and open economy, the finan-
cial remunerations in US dollars that come from participating in UN 
peacekeeping operations are not an attraction and motivation for partic-
ipating in peacekeeping operations. To the contrary, India’s Controller 
Audit General has found that the Indian exchequer incurs a net loss due 
to the UN deployments. The report tabled in the Indian parliament in 
February 2014 stated that the UN owes $81.15 million as reimburse-
ments on account of the UN deployments.85 
UN peacekeeping missions provide the Indian military and police 
personnel exposure to newer conflict situations and an opportunity to 
work with other armies/police personnel of the world and thus widen 
their perspective. While this is true, it has a limited motivational value 
towards the contribution to the UN peacekeeping as the Indian Defence 
Forces these days have other opportunities such as participation joint 
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military exercises with other countries including developed countries 
both at home and abroad. However, it is definitely considered a tool for 
military diplomacy, as the Indian troops at many places have created 
goodwill with the local population and therefore can be utilized for fur-
thering economic and strategic goals. 
The Indian defence forces have also been involved in two regional 
non-UN peacekeeping operations. The first was in Sri Lanka from 1987 
to 1990, the second in Maldives in 1988. In addition to this, India has 
also undertaken nation building in Afghanistan. 
Sri Lanka 
 Indian government considering the pro-Tamil sentiments in its state of 
Tamil Nadu signed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on July 29, 1987, and 
deployed a peacekeeping force on the island. The Indian government be-
came the principal guarantor of a solution to the ethnic violence that had 
heightened dramatically since 1983.86 Nearly 60,000 Indian troops 
participated in this operation as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force 
(IPKF) between 1987 and 1990. 
After the presidential elections in December 1988, Ranasinghe Pre-
madasa, the elected president, declared an end to the five-and-a-half-
year state of emergency and the IPKF to withdraw. Accordingly, IPKF 
withdrew in a phased manner by March 1990. During the three-year in-
volvement, some 1,500 Indian troops were killed and more than 4,500 
were wounded during this operation. The Sri Lanka mission also re-
sulted in the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a Tamil 
militant in 1991 
India’s 1988 intervention in the Maldives 
India’s intervention in the Maldives is a model for the benign security 
role that India could play in the Indian Ocean.  It was undertaken at the 
express invitation of the democratic Maldivian government. India under-
took the intervention alone and demonstrated its ability to airlift troops 
over long distances and successfully intercept the plotters at sea. India 
demonstrated that it could execute a combined services operation in an 
efficient and timely manner. “Operation Cactus” as this intervention was 
known, enhanced India’s prestige enormously and showcased India’s 
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capability to mount a successful operation at short notice. There was 
universal acknowledgement of India’s role.87 
Afghanistan 
India has played a significant role in the reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion of Afghanistan. India realizes that stability can prevail in Afghani-
stan only if all the major actors and countries have a stake in its stability, 
growth and prosperity. India has, thus, been championing efforts to at-
tract regional and trans-regional investment into Afghanistan that pro-
vides a viable alternative to the dominant narrative of extremism and of-
fers job opportunities to its population, by pioneering events like the 
Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan in June 2012.  
India's extensive developmental assistance programme, which now 
stands at around US 2 billion, is a strong signal of its abiding commit-
ment to peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan. India’s assistance 
has focused on infrastructure, engineering, training, and humanitarian 
needs. It has constructed the Afghan parliament building, part of the in-
ter province Ring Road, electrical lines, and the Salma Dam, among oth-
ers. India has also trained Afghan civil servants in Indian academies. The 
Confederation of Indian Industry has trained more than one thousand 
Afghans in carpentry, plumbing, and welding. The Self-Employed Wom-
en's Association of India—a women's trade union—has educated more 
than three thousand Afghan women in micro-enterprise. India has also 
signed an MoU for 57 projects in July 2014 and for 13 ongoing small 
development projects (SDPs) in October 2014 (under US$ 100 million 
commitment for SDP) covering Public Health, Education, and commu-
nity infrastructure in various provinces of Afghanistan.88 
The Indians have learned some valuable lessons in the above three 
operations. These include the realisation that better coordination is 
needed between political decision makers and the defence forces and 
other department of the government for such missions.  It also emerged 
that better intelligence, training, equipment, and command and control 
are required to undertake interventionist peace operations. This experi-
ence is probably embedded in the psyche of policy makers while defin-
ing the guidelines for the UN peacekeeping operations. 
The resurgence of India’s peace operations since the 1990s is based 
more on the ideals for which the country stands and not only an overall 
strategic conception of India‘s interests. On the foreign policy side, it is 
seen as a useful device to promote India’s interests at the UN. On the 
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military side, both for the Ministry of Defence and the Indian Defence 
Forces, peacekeeping has never been a major priority amidst the multi-
ple challenges of internal security and territorial defence. The political 
leadership, which is more focused on the diplomatic value of peacekeep-
ing, has not sought to publicly articulate the strategic rationale for In-
dia’s international peacekeeping efforts in terms of a white paper or any 
published official document. India’s approach, has been mostly driven 
by the inherited traditions. 
Nevertheless, a broad debate has begun in India about peacekeeping 
amidst a broader global discussion on the future of peacekeeping. A 
number of imperatives for change are indeed likely to modify India’s ap-
proach to peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is now likely to be seen as less of 
a lofty ideal, and future participation in UN peacekeeping operations 
would need to be justified in the context of the changing nature of India‘s 
security interests. As an emerging trading nation — more than 40 per 
cent of India’s current GDP is linked to imports and exports – India is 
dependent on import of natural resources and export markets for sus-
taining high economic growth rates and improving the living standards 
of its teeming millions.89 
Indians are of the view that the new trend of using peacekeepers to 
tackle internal political conflicts is an “unsustainable” approach for the 
maintenance of global peace and security. The new trend of mixing 
peacekeeping mandates directly affects the operational effectiveness of 
the peacekeeping operations and exposes traditional mandate peace-
keepers to unnecessary threats from armed internal conflicts. Greater 
strategic support and guidance is required for the peacekeeping opera-
tions to be effective.  
India expresses that the international community must not lose sight 
of the fact that the protection of civilians is first and foremost, a national 
responsibility and requires institutions and conditions in which these in-
stitutions can function. To do that, it is necessary to strengthen the ca-
pacities of the States and their national institutions to enable them to 
fulfil their responsibility to protect their populations. Peacekeepers, in 
spite of their best efforts, cannot possibly “protect everyone from every-
thing”.90  Protecting populations is a resource intensive enterprise. It 
needs sufficient personnel, proper equipment and suitable capacities. 
Political will of the international community and its ability to provide 
                                                          
89  C Raja Mohan, “India’s Military Diplomacy: Legacy of International Peacekeeping,”, 
ISAS Working Paper No. 190 – 13 June 2014. Available at file:///C:/Users/Chan-
der/Downloads/ISAS_Working_Paper_190_-_India's_Military_Diplo-
macy_13062014161354%20(3).pdf . Accessed on May 10, 2015. 
90  Statement by Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, Indian Permanent Representative to 
the UN, at the Open Debate on Protection of civilians in Armed Conflict at the United 
Nations Security Council on February 12, 2013. 
Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report. Rising Powers and Peace Operations 43 
adequate resources is critical to the success of missions in fulfilling their 
protection mandates.  
Further, Indians are of the opinion that the civilians are protected 
best in an eco-system of peace where all its elements work and contrib-
ute in tandem; the International Community represented by the Security 
Council’s efforts should therefore address multiple dimensions of a con-
flict in a comprehensive and proportionate manner. Protection of civil-
ians does not end with a military or police response. Civilians require 
humanitarian wherewithal for survival. In this process, the multiple 
stakeholders should be involved, not just the military. An engagement 
between warring factions in a conflict situation in a nationally owned 
and inclusive political process is of paramount importance. This inclu-
sive approach to national reconciliation, anchored in state sovereignty, 
is the only way to move forward to ensure the protection of civilians in 
an effective, pragmatic, and enduring manner.91 
Many dimensions of the multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping opera-
tions being mandated by the Security Council, in India’s opinion fall into 
the basket of peace-building which constitutes a political objective and 
does not fall under the responsibility of peacekeepers. This leads to a 
heavier drain on the financial, material and human resources being al-
located for peacekeeping.92 
India’s policy makers have been stressing that the views of the T/PCCs 
should be taken into account while formulating peacekeeping man-
dates. The Indians officials have stated that the T/PCCs know the situa-
tion on the ground better than most, as they are in touch daily with de-
velopments and can – on the basis of practical experience – advise on 
what needs to be done. They have also expressed concerns about the 
mixing of the original and new interventionist mandates in peacekeep-
ing operations as these expose the peacekeepers in the same mission 
who have not signed up to intervention to higher risks.93 
India is of the view that the maintenance of international peace and 
security will become more sustainable if the international community 
agrees to adopt a holistic and equitable approach to relations between 
member-states. Capacity building should be a key focus of UN efforts as 
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affected countries emerge from armed conflict situations. If the interna-
tional community wishes to see sustainable peace and stability, then 
state institutions, including in the area of security, rule of law and jus-
tice, need to be augmented and strengthened. States need to take own-
ership as they embark on the difficult process of rebuilding their socie-
ties and countries including consolidation of democratic ideals and 
practices, and effective improvements in socio-economic conditions. It 
is important to recognize that the structural changes can take place only 
in the mid to long term. The UN and the international community must 
step up and sustain their support to the affected States in these critical 
areas.94  
It is imperative, in India’s view that the international community fully 
respects the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all UN 
member-states. The international community must respect the states’ 
right to control and manage their affairs, including natural resources. 
There must be no attempt to be prescriptive about control, management 
and use of natural resources by the states concerned. The role of the in-
ternational community, including the relevant UN agencies, should be 
to enhance development partnerships with countries that experience 
conflict. This should include higher allocations of financial, technical 
and human resources by donors and UN agencies and these must be 
aligned with national priorities of the countries concerned.95 
India has been particularly vocal in its opposition to the Force Inter-
vention Brigade. The brigade’s deployment makes the UN a party to the 
conflict, which India as many member states, fear taints the UN’s neu-
trality with future consequences for peacekeeping operations. It also un-
derscores that the peacekeepers must not become a party to the conflict 
and must respect the principles of neutrality and impartiality on which 
peacekeeping was founded. In addition, in India’s views, taking the case 
of MONUSCO, such mixing of mandates directly affects the operational 
effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations, exposing traditional 
peacekeepers to unnecessary threats from armed internal conflicts 
which the United Nations has not itself instigated.96 
Regional arrangements, in India’s view, can play an appropriate role 
in assisting the UN in maintaining peace; however, the primacy of the 
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UN must be maintained.  The UN cannot disengage with the regional al-
liances by contracting peacekeeping to regional arrangements. It cau-
tions that the impartiality of the UN forces must be maintained as this is 
a possibility that cannot be ruled out with regionalization and sub-re-
gionalization of peacekeeping. On the operational aspect of cooperation 
between UN and regional organizations, it has been India’s experience 
that investment in equipment, logistics and training go a long way in 
making the peacekeeping operations more viable and sustainable.97 
Indians are of the view that the participation of women in peace pro-
cesses and post-conflict reconstruction efforts is necessary to lay the 
foundation for durable peace. While agreeing that the UNSCR 1325 and 
its successor Security Council resolutions have provided a framework for 
effective institutional arrangement and significant progress has been 
achieved but much more needs to be done.98 
Indians believe that the failure of preventive diplomacy gives rise to 
greater demand for resources to tackle threats to international peace and 
security. A successful special political mission can create the framework 
for a sustainable peace, which can be then mid-wifed through time-
bound peacekeeping operations. This is illustrated by the work being 
done by UNAMA in Afghanistan especially due to the draw-down of in-
ternational forces from that country. 
On the financial aspects of the mandates, India has been expressing 
that multidimensional mandates have created a situation wherein new 
mandates of UNPKOs given without providing for matching financial re-
sources. The larger issue of financial imbalance must be taken into ac-
count when looking at the issue of the providing sustainable and pre-
dictable financial support to the peacekeeping operations.99 
Finally, to conclude, India has strong democratic credentials and a 
fairly consistent foreign and security policy. India has developed a con-
sensus-based foreign and security policy over decades.  Changing do-
mestic political alignments have not so far brought about significant 
changes in its foreign policy. There is a balanced consideration of do-
mestic defence priorities and global diplomatic aspirations. The Indian 
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Government so far has not been questioned about its UN troop deploy-
ments and the related challenges. With an emerging educated and so-
cially minded public and a very active media, the government’s deci-
sions are being increasingly put through public scrutiny. The possibility 
of domestic pressures affecting the foreign policy related to peacekeep-
ing should not be ruled out. 
India is pleased that the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Op-
erations has recognized the issues and concerns raised by India and 
looks forward to their early consideration. India's commitment to UN 
Peacekeeping remains strong and will grow. Indian Prime Minister while 
speaking at the UN Summit in September 2015 had announced new in-
tended contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations. 
These include additional battalions of up to 850 troops in existing or 
new operations; an additional 3 Police units with higher representation 
of female peacekeepers; commitment to provide critical enablers; de-
ployment of technical personnel in UN missions; and, additional train-
ing for peacekeepers at the Indian facilities in India and in the field.100 
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Indonesia101 
Participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been a crucial element 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy since its independence in 1945. As of De-
cember 2015, Indonesia deployed 2854 military and police personnel to 
9 UN missions, ranking it as the 12th largest contributor to UN peace 
operations.102 At the world peacekeeping summit in New York in Sep-
tember 2015, Indonesia pledged a further contribution of one composite 
battalion and a Formed Police Unit (FPU), and underscored its vision of 
deploying 4000 uniformed peacekeepers by 2019. The turning point in 
the upward trajectory of Indonesia’s contributions was 2006, when it 
contributed a total of 1058 personnel to 5 missions.  
The nature of Indonesia’s deployment has evolved over the past five 
years. In the past, Indonesia used to primarily deploy in support capaci-
ties such as medical and engineering units in the less risky areas of re-
sponsibility of a mission. Now, it increasingly deploys more infantry bat-
talions and other assets that have a ‘frontline’ function—such as mari-
time capabilities, mechanized infantry battalions, and FPUs. One area 
where it seeks to increase its ‘presence’ is the special political missions.  
The modernization of its armed forces and acquisitions of more so-
phisticated equipment and weaponry are also contributing factors to In-
donesia’s growing capability to deploy to complex and non-permissive 
mission environments. It has acquired transport and combat helicopters 
(e.g. Cougar, Apache, MI-17 and MI-24), large transport aircraft (e.g. 
C-130s), and armoured personnel carriers (APCs, e.g. Black Fox IFV, 
Bushmaster).103 It has also developed and produced its own APCs. Thus, 
in addition to military and police personnel, Indonesia has developed a 
capacity to become a contributor of force enablers.  
Simultaneously, Indonesia has also sought to be an active voice in the 
global discourse on the development of policy. One such initiative was 
the Civilian Capacities initiative.104 On the policing front, POLRI 
(kePolisian Negara Republik Indonesia) has been quite engaged in the 
development of the UN Police’s Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) 
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process, including hosting the thematic meeting in 2013. Indonesia of-
ten convenes the regional outreach meetings on key peacekeeping is-
sues. Most recently, it hosted the Asia-Pacific meeting on peacekeeping 
in support of the US-led Peacekeeping Summit initiative.  
A significant boost toward more active participation in UN peace-
keeping occurred during President Yudhoyono’s government (2004-
2014). His government enacted several regulations and laws to 
strengthen the mechanisms to facilitate Indonesia’s contribution. One of 
the often-cited reasons was his personal involvement in peacekeeping: 
Yudhoyono served in UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Presi-
dent, he aspired to re-shape the country’s image as peacemaker.105 
Drivers for Participation 
Indonesia’s motivation for participation in peacekeeping, like other 
“emerging” and “middle” powers, is associated with prestige and some 
tangible benefits. The preamble to the Indonesian Constitution states 
that a national objective is to participate in preserving world orderliness 
based on freedom, eternal peace and social justice. Indonesia’s 1948 for-
eign policy doctrine of ‘independent and active’ (bebas aktif) continues 
to be a guiding framework of policy objectives. Indonesia’s main moti-
vations can be classified as financial, socio-cultural and its ambition to 
become more influential in the region. 
Indonesia’s active participation in UN peacekeeping operations has 
been influenced by the country’s ambition of becoming a significant re-
gional and global power after recovering from severe economic and po-
litical crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Significantly, the Indo-
nesian government has linked Indonesia’s participation in UN peace op-
erations to its policy priority of seeking UN reform, notably of the Secu-
rity Council. Becoming a member of the UN Security Council is viewed as 
one of the most effective ways for Indonesia to influence reform from in-
side and to increase its role in international security. According to sev-
eral high-ranking officials, Indonesia’s intention to increase its contri-
bution to UN peacekeeping operations is strongly linked to its quest for 
a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in 2019–2020.106 Indone-
sia is also keen to have greater representation in the UN Secretariat, be-
lieving that this would increase its informal influence on the policy de-
velopment process in the UN.  
There is also a socio-cultural dimension to the political drivers to In-
donesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping. Indonesia at times seeks to 
feature its Islamic identity in its foreign policy decisions and to maintain 
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Muslim solidarity, despite its secular state ideology, to satisfy its domes-
tic public.107 This is illustrated by the relatively large deployment to UNI-
FIL (Lebanon) compared to other UN missions, which to some extent cor-
responds with Indonesia’s support for the Palestinian cause. Indonesia’s 
participation in UNIFIL is believed to allay militants in Indonesia riled 
by the violence in the Middle East.108 Indonesia’s commitment to deploy 
peacekeepers to Syria (should a peacekeeping operation be established) 
can also be viewed through this lens.109 
Participating in UN peacekeeping is seen as an effective way to man-
age the so-called idle security capacities, a useful force projection exer-
cise, and a way to increase professionalism among the personnel.110 It is 
also a means of rehabilitating the negative image of the security forces 
who committed human rights violations during the authoritarian regime 
of Suharto.  
Financially, the UN reimbursements are a significant incentive for the 
individual military or police personnel to apply for deployment as the 
US$1028 compensation is triple the domestic monthly salary. At the 
governmental level, the reimbursements help to offset the high costs of 
maintaining equipment since the national budget allocated for military 
spending remains low.111 An indirect economic motivation is promotion 
of Indonesia’s nascent military industry. The home-grown Anoa ar-
moured personnel carrier (APC), used in Lebanon and Darfur, has at-
tracted several countries due to its competitive price and adaptability. 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Nepal and Oman have expressed interest in ac-
quiring the Anoa for their peacekeeping contributions.112 
Concepts and Terminology  
Indonesia recognizes that the political contexts and operational environ-
ments of UN peace operations are increasingly complex and require mul-
tifaceted responses. For Indonesia, the preferred terminology is ‘peace-
keeping operations’ or ‘peacekeeping tasks’ (tugas perdamaian) as artic-
ulated in the 2008 Defence White Paper. The TNI (Indonesian armed 
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forces) loosely refers to peacekeeping operations as ‘military operations 
other than war’.113  
There appears to be a view amongst Indonesian officials, that UN 
peacekeeping is solely an activity under Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
and that operations under Chapter VII are, instead, peace enforcement 
operations because they are authorized to use force. The latter include 
operations conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, some officials contend that In-
donesia does not participate in Chapter VII operations, that missions 
such as MINUSCA or UNAMID are ‘Chapter VI and a half’ missions.114  
There is overwhelming consensus that the Force Intervention Brigade 
(FIB) in MONUSCO is a peace enforcement measure.115 Indonesia is con-
cerned that the FIB model may be the start of a new trend in UN peace-
keeping. 
Principles of Peacekeeping 
Indonesia asserts that the core principles––consent, impartiality, and 
the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate–
–are still intrinsic to the conduct of UN peacekeeping. They are integral 
to the legitimacy, credibility and, eventually, success of a UN peace op-
eration, and should not be undermined. However, with its growing op-
erational experience, Indonesia acknowledges that the current contexts 
in which peace operations deploy may give rise to situations where the 
principles may be challenged and cannot be strictly applied. Indonesia 
therefore contends that it is ever more important that there is clarity of 
purpose and intent when UN peacekeeping missions are authorized. 
This is reflected in numerous statements made to various peacekeeping-
related forums in the UN.116  
Indonesia places particular importance on the principle of consent. 
As an emerging large-scale contributor, Indonesia has been cautious 
and selective in the choice of the missions it contributes to. It has stated 
that it would shy away from missions where consent was ambiguous.117 
In cases where consent from one main conflict party—the host govern-
ment—has become the accepted minimum level of consent, in part be-
cause of the fragmentation of non-state conflict parties, Indonesia has 
not raised any particular objection to the dilution of the principle.118 
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Equally, Indonesia recognizes that consent is dynamic and fluid and is 
differentiated at the strategic and tactical levels. Indonesia also believes 
that the principle of consent also applies to operational issues such as 
the use of certain modern technologies in UN peace operations.119  
The principle of impartiality is important for Indonesia, as apart from 
other issues it helps ensure safety and security to its peacekeepers. In 
2013 Indonesia was approached to provide a C-130 to MONUSCO; keen 
to be a more strategic contributor than just a provider of personnel, In-
donesia responded positively to the request.120 During the negotiations 
with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), when it 
became apparent that the C-130 may at times be used to support the 
transportation of FIB troops, Indonesia quickly withdrew its offer as it 
did not want to be involved in a ‘grey area’ or be open to the potential 
legal ramifications.121  
The growing inter-linkages between the principles of impartiality and 
the non-use of force, particularly in the context of protection of civilians 
(POC) mandates, and their implications for the overall legitimacy of UN 
peacekeeping are of concern to Indonesia. One such example is the de-
ployment of the FIB. Although Indonesia had some reservations that the 
FIB ran the risk of MONUSCO being perceived as a party to the conflict, 
thereby negating its impartiality; Indonesia and the other T/PCCs were 
assured that the FIB would not prejudice their own participation in 
MONUSCO. In 2014, the UN Office of Legal Affairs unambiguously said 
that the Security Council’s authorization of the FIB had made the mis-
sion a party to the conflict and clearly jeopardized the principle of im-
partiality.122 This raised a strong rebuke from the Indonesian govern-
ment because the FIB deployment had squarely impinged on Indonesia’s 
efforts to adhere to the principle of impartiality. 
The use of force in a UN peacekeeping operation is a sensitive issue 
for Indonesia. In earlier years, Indonesia took a conservative and princi-
pled position on the ‘non-use of force except in self-defence’ principle 
and objected to the interpretation of the term ‘self-defence’ to include 
‘pre-emptive strike’ or ‘anticipatory self-defence’.123 With growing expe-
rience, Indonesia recognizes that a more proactive self-defence is at 
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times necessary. It also accepts the notion of robust peacekeeping. Rhe-
torically, however, Indonesia maintains that the prevalent use of force is 
not in keeping with the values of UN peacekeeping. It has called for a 
clearer definition of the term ‘robust peacekeeping’, and for a sharper 
distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.124  
Indonesia fully supports the analysis of the high-level panel on peace 
operations that the UN is not suited to counterterrorism operations. 
Equally, Indonesia affirms that peace enforcement measures or opera-
tions should be undertaken with extreme caution. It would welcome the 
recommendation to draw up criteria for when UN peacekeeping missions 
could use force. 
One practical reason for Indonesia’s opposition to the growing trend 
of robust peacekeeping is that it requires a concomitant increase in ad-
vanced force protection measures, which Indonesia is not yet able to pro-
vide to its troops.125 Indonesia has yet to delineate its own threshold for 
robust peacekeeping and its participation in missions such as MINUSMA 
and MINUSCA, which operate in hostile and volatile environments, may 
further shape its position on this principle. 
Indonesia broadly agrees that one of the imperatives of contemporary 
UN peacekeeping is the protection of civilians. Although Indonesia 
agrees with the POC norm, it has questions on how the norm is opera-
tionalised.  
POC has added a layer of complexity to the ‘use of force’ issue for In-
donesia. It has led to some within the government to conflate POC with 
the use of force: several officials have indicated that POC mandates au-
tomatically require the use of force.126 In particular, the TNI thinks that 
POC is a task primarily for the military component.127 This conflation is 
partly explained by the growing pattern that Indonesia witnesses in the 
global peacekeeping landscape in which POC is seemingly the overrid-
ing justification for many recent developments (e.g. the FIB, the use of 
unarmed UAVs, etc.). Indonesia also perceives that carrying out POC 
mandates has led to an increasing softening of the core principles. To 
that end, Indonesia has insisted on the need to clarify the scope and role 
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of peacekeepers in protecting civilians. Additionally, it underlines that 
the UN’s role should be a supporting one to the host governments.  
Indonesia has consistently advocated for UN peacekeeping to have 
clear and achievable mandates. Indonesia would probably welcome the 
recommendation of the high-level panel to enact a two-stage sequenced 
mandating process. Additionally, Indonesia is of the position that it 
should be more inclusive and draw in potential T/PCCs. 
Indonesia has called for deepening the triangular cooperation be-
tween the Secretariat, Security Council and T/PCCs and articulated for a 
stronger role of T/PCCs in the decision-making processes. Indonesia ar-
gues that T/PCCs need to be fully aware of the situation they are getting 
into, and early on in the process. This is particularly the case when man-
dates undergo significant changes or when they are being renewed. A 
notable example was the lack of sufficient consultation with T/PCCs on 
the decision to create the FIB in MONUSCO prior to the Security Council 
resolution. To improve the triangular cooperation, Indonesia, among 
other countries, has called for more discussions and decisions on strate-
gic policies as well as operational directives to be made in the C-34. The 
panel’s proposal for an institutionalized framework for the triangular 
consultations between the Security Council, the contributing countries 
and the Secretariat, would also be received positively.  
At the mission level, Indonesia believes that, to avoid uneven imple-
mentation of the mandate, greater harmonization in the understanding 
and interpretation of the mandate is necessary among contingent com-
manders and the mission leadership. To address its related concerns that 
contingent commanders do not have sufficient influence over the perfor-
mance of the mission or lack clarity over the mission mandate, Indonesia 
appears to be advocating for contingent commanders to be included in 
the mission leadership.128 The panel’s call for mission leadership to en-
gage early with contingent commanders on changes to the mission man-
date is a concrete step in addressing Indonesia's concerns. 
There is a general acceptance by Indonesia that peace operations 
serve as early peacebuilders. What is open to question however, is when 
the ‘early peacebuilding’ ends and when the ‘sustainable peacebuilding’ 
efforts begin. Indonesian officials have stated that there is an insufficient 
discussion of what the objectives of the early peacebuilding tasks are, 
what the standards should be and, more fundamentally, what the tasks 
themselves should be.129 Critically, Indonesia underlines that ‘the pri-
mary responsibility of identifying priorities and strategies, in particular 
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for post-conflict peacebuilding, should remain in the hands of host 
countries’.130 
Indonesia’s growing involvement in UN peace operations is likely to 
shape its views and position on the practice of peacekeeping. Indonesia 
thus far has been a relatively accommodating T/PCC. It often acquiesces 
to DPKO’s requests and rarely places limits or restrictions by way of ca-
veats on how its troops or police are to be deployed. Indonesia can be 
said to be testing the waters in peacekeeping to assess the different op-
erational environments and to see what plays to its strengths. Indone-
sia’s desire to build a resolute, positive image also partly explains its 
keenness to perform well in missions. As Indonesia’s experience deep-
ens, it may begin to put its self-interests ahead of its desire to maintain a 
good reputation. 
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Russia131 
Russia considers peacekeeping one of the main functions of the UN.  
Russia consistently prioritizes peacekeeping as an important multilat-
eral instrument, which should be applied to reduce conflict among in-
ternational actors and manage crises that threaten international law and 
security.132As the legal successor to the Soviet Union, the Russian Fed-
eration inherited the Soviet Union’s political assets and responsibilities 
regarding peacekeeping, including its central role on the UN Security 
Council. At present, Russia has 92 personnel assigned to UN peacekeep-
ing missions, including: 29 police officers, 60 military observers, and 
three troops.133 Current numbers of personnel are lower than average for 
Russia, which in 2010 was 366 personnel, which includes: 55 police of-
ficers, 77 military observers, and 239 troops.  
Russian personnel have previously served in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO), the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC), Kosovo (UNMIK), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS), 
and East Timor (UNMIT). Russian (at the time Soviet) participation in UN 
peacekeeping missions dates back to the second United Nations Emer-
gency Force mission established in 1973 to quell troop activity in the 
Middle East. 
The largest military contingent Russia ever contributed to a UN mis-
sion served in the former Yugoslavia. On March 6, 1992 the Supreme So-
viet of the Russian Federation passed a resolution sending 900 Russian 
peacekeepers to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 400 of which were transferred 
to Kosovo in 1999. In June 1999, an additional 3,600 Russian troops 
were sent to Kosovo, where they stayed until July 2003. The most tech-
nically equipped mission that Russia has been engaged in took place in 
Sudan in 2006, consisting of 120 men and 4 helicopters.  
Russia’s contribution has historically ranked somewhere between 
twentieth and fortieth, depending on the year in question; significantly 
lower than the United Kingdom, France, China, and many others. The 
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main factors limiting Russian participation in UN peacekeeping are: do-
mestic turbulence and conflict in the post-Soviet space as well as other 
priorities outside the auspices of the UN134.  
Russia is committed to deterring and preventing military conflicts as 
reflected in Article 19 of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 
which calls for Russia “to participate in international peacekeeping ac-
tivities, including under the auspices of the United Nations and within 
the framework of interaction with international (regional) organiza-
tions.”135  This document serves as the legal basis for Russia’s participa-
tion in peacekeeping operations by both the UN and other international 
regional organizations.  
Russia only contributes about 2% of the annual UN peacekeeping 
budget. Leading Russian expert Alexander Nikitin notes that this “re-
flects the fact that while Russia pays its assessed contributions for UN 
peacekeeping it does not make significant additional voluntary contri-
butions.”136 Russia is also the second largest supplier of contractor ser-
vices. “In 2011, Russian companies held contracts from the UN worth 
$382 million, [all of which comprised of aviation transportation ser-
vices] and composed 14% of [total] UN peacekeeping services.”137 
Russian support to UN peacekeeping activities should be understood 
in the context of its broader policy towards the UN. In relation to world 
order, Moscow attributes enormous importance to the United Nations as 
the central institution in the global political architecture.  Russia, does 
not consider herself a revisionist power, but a status-quo power (alt-
hough some experts would also argue that Russia is a ‘descending 
power.’) Furthermore, Russia insists on preserving the original Yalta – 
Potsdam international system.138 Assertive actions taken by Russia, for 
example in relation to Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, should be 
considered not revisionist initiatives, but a reaction to aggressive actions 
undertaken by the West. These actions have attempted to change the sta-
tus-quo by broadening the West’s sphere of influence. 
Russia detests the concept of a US-centric international order and he-
gemony, insisting on increased multi-lateral and balance coordination 
among great powers. This perspective is present in the current Foreign 
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Policy Concept, which states that, “…international relations are in the 
process of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a polycentric 
system of international relations.”139  
The current leadership of the Russian Federation maintains a more 
realist understanding of world order than its liberal counterparts, in 
which the world is seen as a competitive arena where nations simply at-
tempt to promote their national interests. Russia believes that the United 
Nations is the key mechanism in seeking compromises between nations 
as well as the only institution that, despite its problems, can maintain 
global stability and predictability. Russia sees the world without the UN 
as dangerous, unpredictable, prone to conflicts, and, certainly, unfair. 
The current Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 
of 2013 states that, “the United Nations should remain the center of in-
ternational relations and coordination in world politics in the 21st cen-
tury, as it has proven to have no alternative and also possesses unique 
legitimacy. Russia supports the efforts aimed at strengthening the UN's 
central and coordinating role.”140  
Peacekeeping operations conducted in regions of direct strategic in-
terest to Russia are considered both an instrument for keeping the peace 
and resolving humanitarian problems as well as a tool for perusing in-
ternational leverage and maintenance of national policy interests. Rus-
sia’s strategy towards peacekeeping is not unlike that of other nations.  
Russia takes both a pragmatic and, fundamentally, realist outlook 
(based on a range of issues related to peacekeeping) in order to form for-
eign policy. Principally, Russia views peacekeeping as a component of 
its foreign policy and, thus, participation is determined based on Rus-
sia’s national interests. Consistently, Russia tends to support interven-
tions that preserve the status quo. This stance is applicable in many re-
spects to Russia’s foreign policy structure.  
The Russian government believes that the UN Security Council 
should customarily sanction international peacekeeping missions. Only 
in exceptional cases and through intergovernmental agreements should 
peacekeeping operations by regional organisations be authorised. How-
ever, this exception is applicable only when a regional organisation ini-
tialises a mission within their prescribed geographical boundaries. 
Peacekeeping missions beyond these legal premises are to be considered 
illegal and a violation of international law. 
Generally, Russia believes that UN peacekeeping operations have not 
been sufficiently effective and implementation strategies require urgent 
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reform. However, Moscow does not consider institutional structural to 
be the root cause of such failure. Instead, actions by the US and its West-
ern allies have been the primary drivers of ineffective initiatives. Mos-
cow’s relationship with its Western partners has undergone a series of 
changes. Immediately after the fall of the USSR, Russia actively partici-
pated in international peacekeeping and shared similar goals as those of 
the West. Yet, it soon became apparent that peacekeeping operations 
were being used for political benefit (rather than for their stated purpose 
of conflict resolution), in particularly during the US and NATO interven-
tion in Yugoslavia. The need for reform of the UN peacekeeping system 
became impeccably clear following the forced breakup of Yugoslavia, 
the disagreeable punishment of the Milošević regime, and other such sit-
uations. 
The Assistant Director of the Department of International Organiza-
tions of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Zaemskii him-
self asserted that,  
“a new level of regulations put forth by the world community on the 
issue of peacekeeping activities, substantially broadened the range of 
goals and means for their attainment. On one hand, the established 
methods of peacekeeping have undergone a substantial evolution, on 
the other, the number of tasks that must be addressed in the course 
of peacekeeping operations have multiplied exponentially. The vari-
ety of forms of modern peacekeeping methods, including with the 
participation of regional organizations or coalitions, is a natural and 
necessary development, but what must remain immutable is the lead 
role of the UN as the only universal organization of its kind, to whose 
charter all members of the international community are bound to ad-
here.”141 
In Moscow’s opinion, necessary UN peacekeeping reforms consist of two 
principal components: the increase of the effectiveness of the crisis-re-
action mechanism and the development of clear legal guidelines for the 
use of force in international relations. The UN Security Council should 
spearhead reforms. First and foremost, measures need to be taken to en-
hance the quality of both preparation and implementation of peacekeep-
ing operations. To realize this goal, it is necessary to create various well-
trained multinational teams. Each team would consist of 5,000 people 
and would need to be deployable to any crisis centre within a month. 
The Security Council should provide a clear and obtainable mandate to 
these teams, and multinational teams in turn should strictly adhere to 
this mandate.  
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Secondly, it is the opinion of the Russian Federation, that sanction 
regime frameworks should be seriously revised. In a best case scenario 
revised sanction regimes would be: approved by the UN Security Coun-
cil; consist of defined time-limits; as well as include built in review peri-
ods in regards to possible humanitarian consequences, civilian suffer-
ing, and the negative effects of sanctions on ‘third’ countries.  
Thirdly, Russia continues to support the reinvigoration and activa-
tion of a UN Security Council Military Staff Committee. Finally, Moscow 
supports the expansion of partnerships between the UN and regional or-
ganizations, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
Moscow considers increasing coordination between the UN and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the area of peacekeeping 
as an example of successful progress in partnership. Nonetheless, Rus-
sia opposes the replacement of the UN by regional structures.142  
In addition, Russia emphasises that peacekeeping activities must ad-
here to fundamental principles of international law, in particular the UN 
Charter. For example, Russian representatives have introduced a pro-
posal to the UN to collectively clarify the limitations of the use of force in 
the context of globalisation. Legal principles may not be used to violate 
the basic principles of sovereignty and state territorial integrity. The US 
has consistently violated these principles based on artificial justifica-
tions such as: ‘limited sovereignty,’ ‘humanitarian intervention,’ and/or 
the ‘responsibility to protect.” 143  
In addition, Russia considers ‘precedent’ as a key principle of inter-
national law. Although Russia protested against the independence of 
Kosovo in 2008, it referred to the principle of ‘precedent’ when granting 
recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as the Crimean refer-
endum in 2014. Yet, Russia rejects the continued monopoly of a small 
group of chosen countries to interpret and violate international law, and 
will not initiate such actions itself. 
With regards to the normative interpretation of international law, 
Russia stresses the need for strengthened early warning systems and 
preventative diplomacy measures. Speaking at the 54th session of the 
General Assembly in 1999, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor 
Ivanov warned,  
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“The founding fathers of the UN envisioned the capability of respond-
ing, on a legal basis, to the violation of peace and security. The inter-
national community can resort to coercive measures, but this must be 
done in accordance with the UN Charter and by a decision of the Se-
curity Council. Non-legal means can only compromise legal ends. 
This is precisely the view that informs our understanding of doctrines 
such as the concept of “humanitarian intervention”. We must be ex-
ceptionally careful in our approach to any coercive measures, and 
even more so in not allowing them to become a tool of repression to 
be used against states or peoples that one or another state finds ob-
jectionable.”144 
Russia views peacekeeping initiatives in the context of two central 
trends. First, regional organizations or coalitions of powerful nations 
have increasingly begun engagement prior to UN authorization. These 
actors have either sought a mandate ex post facto or interpreted existing 
mandates to meet their needs. Thus, essentially eliminating the need for 
a UN mandate. The second trend is represented in a departure from the 
traditional, non-partisan nature of UN decisions in response to increased 
interethnic, religion and/or ideological conflicts. These developments 
have been understood as a threat to world order and the traditional role 
of peacekeeping operation as well as an opportunity to advance Russian 
security interests.  
Russia has played a substantial role in the development of UN peace-
keeping procedures. These procedures are virtually unilaterally under-
stood as: a clear mandate; consent of the parties in conflict; impartiality 
of the missions; and the non-use of force by peacekeepers, except in self-
defence and in defence of the mission’s mandate. Additionally, Russia 
regards the non-participation of the military contingents of great powers 
in peacekeeping missions as a customary principle of peacekeeping. Ra-
ther, ‘third’ countries should staff military personnel. This principle was 
established by the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement between Israel 
and Syria.  
Russia regularly emphasises that UN decisions should be imple-
mented by regional organisations in their respective region. Addition-
ally, major supra regional powers, such as Russia, must undertake facil-
itation rather than control of implementation. Russian emphasis of this 
dynamic derives from scepticism of interference in regional conflicts by 
U.S. and its Western allies. Russia considers interference in opposition 
to its interests and instead a potential pathway for further Western dom-
inance. Secondly, Russia envisions that organisation of the post-soviet 
space—the traditional sphere of influence of the Russian Federation—
should be dominated by organisations where Moscow plays a leading 
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role such as the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO).  
Russia is convinced that African leaders should play a leading role in 
resolving their own regional conflicts. In May 2014, following a meeting 
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Partnership of the 
Republic of South Sudan, Benjamin Barnaba, the Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, stated  “The African Union and sub-re-
gional organisations on the continent have proven that they are ready to 
take the initiative and act as peacekeepers, and they deserve all neces-
sary support from the UN and the Security Council[…]As far as future 
conflict management is concerned, in Somalia, the Central African Re-
public, Mali, the DRC, and the Great Lake Region as a whole, Russia as a 
permanent member of the Security Council will continue to play an im-
portant part in peacekeeping on the African Continent”.145 
In some exceptions, Russia accepts the broad interpretation of UN 
mandates, emphasising the importance of objectives and political con-
sequences rather than the scale of the mission itself. Examples include: 
Russia’s support of both UN Resolution 2100 on Mali as well as Resolu-
tion 1590 on Sudan as well as opposition to US-sponsored resolution on 
Syria in 2012.  
In conclusion, Russia shares the general humanitarian concerns of 
other members of the international community. Moscow remains op-
posed to violent actions taken within internal conflicts and prioritises 
conflicts within Russia’s sphere of national interests. However, peace-
keeping interventions should not be conducted for national interests, 
but rather to maintain the Yalta-Potsdam international system. The fol-
lowing principles reflect Russia’s logic in regards to global politics: 
a. Within the context of normal international practice, the interests 
of state actors shall be prioritized above non-state actors; 
b. Attempted regime change–including those undertaken by 
means of peacekeeping operations–is illegitimate; 
c. The UN Security Council is the only body that can legitimately 
approve peacekeeping operation and international intervention. 
Outside this framework only intergovernmental agreements, 
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which include the state whose territory the operation will take 
place in, can serve as a legitimate exception to this principle; 
d. All other attempts at ‘peacekeeping’ that lack such mandates 
(e.g., ‘coalitions of the willing’) are illegitimate; 
e. Peacekeeping operations should not result in geopolitical or eco-
nomic achievements by the initiating countries; and 
f. In determining mandate objective and priorities, neighbouring 
countries possess a stronger vested interest in the region. Thus, 
their opinions should be considered before those of international 
actors from outside the region. 
The Russian view is that attempts to manage crises through unilateral 
sanction and other coercive measures outside the framework of the UN 
Security Council, including armed aggression, are in direct conflict with 
global peace and stability. Additionally, some international concepts are 
being utilised under the guise of civilian protection to overthrow legiti-
mate authorities. Coercive measures and military force without the ap-
proval of the UN Security Council will not eliminate profound socio-eco-
nomic, ethnic and other antagonisms that cause conflicts.146  
Russia conceives current changes in UN peacekeeping operations 
problematic in two ways:  1) peacekeeping operations have the potential 
be used unilaterally for geopolitical and economic gains; and 2) such 
peacekeeping operations, conceived and carried out for geopolitical ob-
jectives, may only cause increased chaos and instability. In the instance 
where these problems are resolved, Russia has no objections to robust 
peacekeeping missions; the use of force; or implementation of modern 
equipment, such as reconnaissance drones or other means of technical 
support of the UN missions. 
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South Africa147 
South Africa’s first engagement in international peace operations came 
about in 1998 when it led a Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Combined Task Force intervention into Lesotho to prevent a mil-
itary coup. South Africa’s first UN deployment came in 1999 when it de-
ployed unarmed military observers to MONUC in the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC). Its first major UN contribution came in 2004 when 
South African troops stationed in Burundi, as part of the African Union 
(AU) mission to Burundi (AMIB) were re-hatted to form the basis of the 
UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Since then South Africans have served 
in 14 AU and UN peacekeeping missions, with annual contributions of 
approximately 2,500 soldiers and police officers.148 
South Africa’s emergence as a contributor to international peace op-
erations has been characterised by several trends. First, its contributions 
are strongly informed by the country’s political engagements on the Af-
rican continent, notably its efforts at conflict prevention and manage-
ment. South African deployments to Burundi and the DRC were charac-
terised by Pretoria’s leading role as a facilitator in the peace processes in 
both countries, whereas the South African deployment to Darfur paved 
the way for South Africa to play a role in the resolution of conflicts in the 
Sudan(s). Second, South Africa has deployed its forces in UN-led opera-
tions, through regional and sub-regional organisations, as well as 
through bilateral arrangements. Third, South Africa’s contributions to 
peace operations are linked to its growing self-image as an emerging 
“middle power,” and as an African power, in the international arena. 
Consequently, South Africa views such operations as a foreign policy 
tool which can support its ambition to play a leading role in regional and 
international multilateral forums.149 
The current growth potential of South Africa as a contributor to inter-
national peacekeeping appears limited because defence spending over 
the course of the past decade has not kept pace with the growth in inter-
national deployments. Pretoria’s deployment of approximately 2,500 
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personnel on peacekeeping duties at any given point in time thus ap-
pears to have reached a ceiling for the time-being.  In fact, South Africa 
announced that it will withdraw its battalion in UNAMID in April 2016. 
This decision seems to be primarily motivated by austerity measures the 
South African Government is taking in an attempt to reduce Government 
expenditure. South Africa has deployed various special capacities over 
the years, including medical, aviation and engineering units, as well as 
helicopters. South Africa’s most recent deployment as part of the Forced 
Intervention Brigade, in the eastern DRC as part of MONUSCO, also saw 
the first deployment of a squadron of South African produced attack hel-
icopters. 
South Africa's contributions to international peacekeeping were fore-
seen by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1994). This 
states that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is to act 
both in defence of the republic and in fulfilment of international obliga-
tions. But this envisaged role proved controversial, and both the Defence 
White Paper of May 1996 and the subsequent Defence Review of 1998, 
that argued that the primary role of the SANDF was to protect South Af-
rica’s territorial integrity and that only limited resources should be set 
aside for international peace operations. However, and additional policy 
process produced a clear, albeit nascent; policy framework that under-
pinned the country’s evolving understanding and approach to interna-
tional peacekeeping. 
However, to effectively prepare South Africa for what was (domesti-
cally and internationally) expected to become a growing role in the pre-
vention and resolution of conflicts, particularly on the African continent, 
the Department of Foreign Affairs (now the Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation – DIRCO) developed a White Paper on South 
African Participation in International Peace Missions (the White Paper). 
This was approved by Cabinet in October 1998 and tabled in Parliament 
in February 1999, and, arguably, remains the most salient official docu-
ment, to date, that details the country’s official policy-level understand-
ing and approach to international peace operations. The White Paper im-
portantly, and for the first time – in an official policy paper – broadened 
the country’s existing understanding of peace operations beyond the 
role of the SANDF, by including in its prescriptions a civilian as well as 
police dimension. Additionally, the 1999 White Paper posited a signifi-
cant contribution to the country’s understanding and approach to inter-
national peace operations by arguing that, despite the complex admix-
ture of humanitarian, military and security-related factors, such opera-
tions are fundamentally political initiatives – and should be primarily 
understood as such by all concerned stakeholders and actors. To this ef-
fect, the 1999 White Paper explicitly underscored the necessity of basing 
all future participation in international peace operations on the extent 
to which such involvement supported and advanced the country’s na-
tional interests, with particular regard to six key principles, namely 
(South Africa’s): 
Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report. Rising Powers and Peace Operations 65 
a. Commitment to the promotion of human rights;  
b. Commitment to the promotion of democracy; 
c. Commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of 
relations between nations;  
d. Commitment to international peace and to internationally 
agreed- upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts;  
e. Commitment to the interests of Africa in world affairs;  
f. Commitment to economic development through regional and in-
ternational co-operation in an inter-dependent world.   
This broadened political focus thus necessitated a greater elaboration on 
the operational roles, responsibilities and functions of organs of state, 
ministries and departments, far beyond previous allusions to the cen-
trality of the Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Underpinning the relationship between national interest and the coun-
try’s participation in international peace operations, was an appraisal of 
the how the country’s approach to conflict resolution, in general, was 
informed by its own recent history – and the subsequent reputation that 
it had built around this approach within the international system. Sub-
sequently, South Africa officially came to view its involvement and con-
tribution to international peace missions as longer-term endeavours that 
heavily invest in directed pre- and -post-conflict interventions that incor-
porate preventive diplomacy and peace building in equal measure. In-
deed, a growing and increasingly detailed table of technical understand-
ings concerning, inter alia, the substance or nature of preventive diplo-
macy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement continued to 
evolve during this period – which underscored the country’s early ap-
preciation of the utility of the so-called ‘full-spectrum’ approach toward 
international peace and security. 
In this context, the primacy of the UN Security Council, as well as the 
growing prominence of regional and sub-regional intergovernmental ac-
tors to sanction and authorise international peace missions – under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter was acknowledged as critical to the coun-
try’s future engagements in international peace missions. The focus on 
regional, and sub-regional, mandates proved to be particularly signifi-
cant given the institutional evolution of the OAU to the AU – and the 
consequent evolution of its various components dealing specifically 
with peace and security issues on the continent. To this effect, the coun-
try further recognised that, given certain constraints and shortcomings 
of the UN system, the significance of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter 
which focuses on the provisions set aside for certain regional and sub-
regional bodies to undertake peace missions in their respective regions, 
on the basis of their own initiative, would be crucial to the effectiveness 
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of its own approach and role toward the peace and security challenges 
confronting the continent in general, and Southern Africa in particular. 
The 1999 White Paper also provided DIRCO with the lead responsi-
bility of overseeing and coordinating South Africa’s involvement in in-
ternational peacekeeping missions, and to this effect the Department es-
tablished a National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions 
(NOCPM). Aside from being mandated to coordinate South African en-
gagement in international peace operations and maintaining political 
oversight of such missions, the NOCPM is also tasked to lead Pretoria’s 
whole-of-government approach to international peace operations, 
thereby leading the combined planning of the Department of Defence, 
the Department of Safety and Security, and the National Treasury. While 
the NOCPM is responsible for overseeing the planning and deployment 
of personnel in support of international peace missions, the decision to 
contribute to such operations, however, is ultimately taken at the level 
of the executive branch of the government, in this case by the Cabinet – 
with the approval of Parliament. Once the Cabinet has taken a decision 
to contribute to a peace operation, the decision is relayed by the Minister 
for International Relations and Cooperation, and the NOCPM initiates a 
whole-of-government planning and oversight process. This process is 
the same whether the operation is UN-led, UN-authorized or a non-UN 
peace operation. In this way, the country has increasingly consolidated 
its understanding and approach to international peace missions, within 
a democratic and institutional system that emphasizes public approval, 
and the application of foreign policy in tandem with the recognition of 
domestic factors and constraints. 
Foreign policy, once formulated, can be implemented by various 
means. The SANDF accepts its role to act as a foreign policy instrument 
of the South African Government. In this context, the Draft Defence Re-
view 2014 states that “the promotion of peace and stability in the region 
and on the continent is a key component of South Africa’s foreign pol-
icy.” Additionally, and with particular regard to its official conception of 
peace missions, South Africa stresses the fact such endeavours must be 
understood as primarily political in nature – and that its involvement 
should extend far beyond considerations solely to do with SANDF, to en-
compass the roles that could be played – for example – by civilians, the 
police and the deployment of technical expertise to effect capacity-build-
ing and reconciliation. 
The main rationale driving South African contributions to provide 
peacekeepers abroad is political. Two political considerations in partic-
ular underpin South Africa’s growing desire to contribute to interna-
tional peace missions. First, South Africa views its own development and 
prosperity as hinging on the development and prosperity of the African 
continent. On this basis, the country has articulated a foreign policy 
which is designed to promote economic and social development 
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throughout the African continent, which in turn requires the strengthen-
ing of peace and security across it. Pretoria therefore views contributions 
to sub-regional, regional, and UN peace operations as an intrinsic part 
of its foreign policy aims and objectives. Second, South Africa has in-
creasingly come to use its role as a facilitator in peace processes, which 
is reinforced through the deployment of peacekeeping personnel, to lev-
erage its position in multilateral forums, especially in the UN. This has 
allowed South Africa to “punch above its weight,” and has strengthened 
its case for a permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council. Both of 
these considerations help to explain why all South African contributions 
to date have been to peace operations in Africa, and why it seems un-
likely that Pretoria would consider a deployment outside of the conti-
nent.  
Additionally, an assessment of the country’s relatively recent inter-
ventions and related efforts in terms of regional and continental peace 
and security does indeed credit the fact that South Africa has not gener-
ally appeared to be reluctant to assume a decisive leadership role by, for 
example, initiating a range of key diplomatic processes, preventive di-
plomacy engagements, and contributing to multilateral peace missions 
– as it is understood in terms of the full-spectrum approach. Moreover, 
throughout these interventions and efforts, South Africa has laid a 
strong emphasis on the need for obtaining coherent domestic, sub-re-
gional, regional and international mandates in order to inform its re-
sponses prior to any on-the-ground interventions, whilst dually ac-
knowledging the utility of multidimensionality throughout all levels of 
its approach. 
Two barriers inhibit an expansion of South African contributions to 
peacekeeping, namely, the financial costs incurred in peace operations, 
and capacity-related institutional, or structural, constraints. Contribu-
tions to AU and UN peacekeeping missions have proved costly in the 
past, and South Africa has not always been able to recover costs associ-
ated with its deployments. While South Africa has the ability to absorb 
some of these costs, this is not sustainable in the long-term, and could 
impact on future decisions to deploy. Capacity-related institutional, or 
structural, constraints are a major factor that restricts further deploy-
ments. South Africa’s ability to properly equip and support personnel 
deployed abroad for sustained periods of time will likely remain a major 
obstacle impeding further deployments in the near future. In particular, 
the country is in need of air lift capabilities to deploy and sustain its per-
sonnel to peacekeeping theatres across the continent. 
South Africa is actively engaged with SADC, the AU and the UN policy 
processes to shape future peace operations policies and doctrine. In both 
SADC and AU contexts, South Africa has supported the development of 
the SADC Standby Arrangement and the African Standby Force (ASF), 
and in addition South Africa also played a leading role in the initiative 
to establish the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis 
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(ACIRC), as an interim measure, until the ASF is fully operational. In Jan-
uary 2016 the AU declared the ASF operational following the AMANI II 
field training exercise hosted by South Africa in 2015.  
In 2015, South Africa actively engaged in the work of the UN high-
level independent panel which carried out a review of UN peace opera-
tions and supported the development of an African Common Position on 
the UN high-level panel. The panel’s endorsement of a strong strategic 
partnership between the UN and the AU, and the need to secure predict-
able sources of funding for AU peace operations was welcomed by South 
Africa, who has campaigned for the same principles at the highest level. 
South Africa also supports strengthening the UN’s ability to carry out its 
protection of civilians mandate, including through a more robust peace-
keeping posture, where necessary, as demonstrated by South Africa’s 
willingness to contribute troops and helicopters to the Forced Interven-
tion Brigade in the DRC. South Africa is also committed to the im-
portance of developing senior leadership for AU and UN missions. Cur-
rently South Africans hold the posts of Special Representative of the UN 
mission in Afghanistan, Special Representative for the UN at the AU and 
Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, head of the AU High-level Imple-
mentation Panel for Sudan, Force Commander in MONUSCO, and Police 
Commissioners in UNAMID and AMISOM. South Africa is also strongly 
committed to the primacy of the political dimension of peace operations, 
as can be seen by the strong link between South Africa’s peacemaking 
efforts and its subsequent peace operations deployments. 
Despite this progress, certain shortcomings of the SANDF –as alluded 
to in the country’s 2014 Draft Defence Review – presents a particularly 
concerning conundrum to the country’s leaders in so far as the question 
of whether policy should dictate current capacity, or vice versa, is con-
cerned. What is clear, however, is that there may well be a scaling-back 
of South African participation in international peace operations, in the 
short- to medium-term, given the SANDF’s current challenges – and the 
efforts required to arrest this – will have a significant impact on the 
country’s capacity to live up to its current (and potential future) commit-
ments vis-à-vis regional and continental peace and security. One possi-
ble way around this may entail South Africa adopting a more hands-off 
approach by prioritizing greater regional and continental peace and se-
curity responses via regional and continental actors and stakeholders, 
continuing to stress the merits of preventive action as opposed to post-
conflict intervention, and supporting the efforts of other actors through 
the provision of technical and non-military assistance. Regardless, the 
final approval of the latest Defence Review will have far-reaching impli-
cations and dictate whether or not the country will stray toward continu-
ity or change in its approach to, understanding of, and participation in 
international peace operations. 
Turkey150 
Turkey conducts peace operations and related activities through four or-
ganizations in the following order of priority: the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the United Nations 
(UN), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE). Within these organizations there are a variety of peace opera-
tions that Turkey participates in. These include Chapter VII operations, 
observer missions, civilian and police missions, rule of law missions, 
and hybrid missions between the UN and regional organizations. Since 
2000, Turkey has participated in a range of missions from the Caribbean, 
Africa, the Balkans, Caucuses, and Middle East to Central Asia and the 
South Pacific. As of September 2015, Turkey has been contributing to 11 
UN peace operations, three EU missions, three NATO missions, and the 
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine. In addition, Turkey 
also contributes to the Temporary International Presence in Hebron 
(TIPH) in the West Bank, which is an independent mission insularly fi-
nanced by six participating states.151 
Modernisation, security, and, particularly, identity construction have 
been some of the main motivations behind Turkey joining multilateral 
organisations such as the UN and participating in their peace operations. 
Up until the 1990s, Turkey had been largely concerned with the internal 
and the territorial security of the country and did not participate in peace 
operations. This began to shift with the end of the Cold War and the out-
break of war in the Balkans in the 1990s, which pushed Turkey to be-
come more engaged in peace operations. Turkey approached these mis-
sions from a security and military perspective with troop contributions. 
This is in part due to Turkey’s prioritisation of NATO missions above oth-
ers. Such an affiliation and approach has been influenced not only by 
the country’s challenging neighbourhood and the resulting militarised 
state of Turkish relations but also by the internal dynamics within the 
country.  
Instigated by Turkey's candidacy for the EU, a transformation in Tur-
key’s traditional civil-military relations has occurred over the past dec-
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ade, with civilian governments gaining increased control over the mili-
tary and, therefore, decisions regarding peace operations.152 Such trans-
formations were also supported by decreased fighting with Kurdish sep-
aratists and stable economic growth for much of the 2000s. These inter-
nal changes were also accompanied by a realignment of Turkish foreign 
policy considerations that have directly impacted its engagement in 
peace operations. 
In 2000, a Defence White Paper was produced that states the moral 
and strategic importance of peace operations to Turkey.153 The White Pa-
per is critical for outlining Turkey’s position on peace operations on a 
number of fronts. It outlines Turkey’s support for regional and multilat-
eral peacekeeping activities that are authorised under the UN Charter. 
And it highlights regions of strategic priority to Turkey, which include 
the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the 
Black Sea, respectively. 
These positions were reinforced by the 2005 policy paper, Concept on 
Turkey's Contribution to Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations. 
Signed by then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on March 15, 
2005, it is one of the key policy documents for Turkey, outlining the prin-
ciples to guide Turkish decision-making on peace operations.154 The pa-
per, which has not been made publicly available, stipulates that a peace 
operation must be seen as internationally legitimate and, therefore, au-
thorised by the United Nations Security Council. The paper reinforces the 
Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East as priority geographic areas 
for Turkey’s participation in peace operations. Another notable aspect of 
the paper is that it states that peace operations are recognised and prior-
itised through NATO, the EU, the UN, and the OSCE, respectively. This 
illustrates Turkey’s preference to work outside UN efforts. 
With the rise of the Justice and Development Party, ideational factors, 
particularly the image of Turkey as an emerging regional actor, have be-
come more prevalent and replaced security concerns as the primary mo-
tivation for participating in peace operations. As such, Turkey has been 
more engaged in multilateral forums. For example, since 2006 Turkey’s 
financial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations have been in-
creasing. It is the 22nd largest contributor to the United Nations Peace-
building Fund, paying 1.7 million dollars in 2015.155 This recent support 
                                                          
152  Satana, N. (2013). “Turkey.” In A. Bellamy., & P. D. Williams (eds). Providing 
peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Peacekeep-
ing Contributions.  Oxford University Press. 
153  “Turkey: Defense White Paper 2000.” Retrieved from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Dig-
ital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?id=154907 Accessed 12 May 2015. 
p. 18. 
154  Satana, (2013).  
155  “Ahmet Davutoğlu Speech at Leadership Summit on Peacekeeping,” 70th Session 
of the UN General Assembly New York, (29 September 2015). Retrieved from 
Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report. Rising Powers and Peace Operations 71 
for multilateralism is notable given Turkey’s historical preference for bi-
lateral engagement. Additionally, Turkish leaders and representatives 
have become more active on a number of security and humanitarian is-
sues in NATO, the EU, UN, and OSCE. This has been accompanied by 
high profile international mediation initiatives. And at the UN, Turkey 
has been promoting preventative diplomacy and non-violent conflict 
resolution methods. To this end and in partnership with Finland, it has 
created the “Group of Friends of Mediation” and developed the “UN 
Guidance for Effective Mediation” booklet. During NATO’s mission in 
Libya, Turkey continually pressured NATO to continue to explore diplo-
matic options with Libyan parties.156 It is clear that Turkey has shifted 
its engagement in these organizations as it tries to become a norm and 
agenda-setter. 
In this regard Turkey’s participation in peace operations is just an-
other tangible illustration reflecting the country’s growing regional and 
international activism alongside increased trade relations and political 
engagement. In one instance, it was suggested by some Turkish parlia-
mentarians that Turkey’s limited participation in MONUSCO (UN Organ-
ization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo had supported trade expansion 
with African nations.157 These rationales are particularly important to 
understand given that Parliament determines whether the country will 
contribute to a peace operation and the Turkish public’s apathy for such 
activities.158 
The gradual shifts in internal power dynamics in Turkey have also in-
fluenced perceptions with respect to its engagement in peace operations.  
“Peace operation” is generally used by Turkish officials today as the pre-
ferred term to peacekeeping, which they associate more with the use of 
military forces.159 However, “peace support” or “peace preservation” are 
also used by Turkish personnel to describe their contributions reflecting 
their emphasis on the peace aspect of international activities.  
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Some general trends have emerged within Turkey’s engagement in 
peace operations. Turkish troops predominantly participate in UN au-
thorised NATO peace operations as compared to any other organisation. 
There have only been two missions outside of NATO that Turkish troops 
have significantly contributed to in the last fifteen years. Those are UNI-
FIL in Lebanon, with Turkish troop numbers dwindling, and EUFOR in 
Bosnia. One reason for this pattern could be that NATO membership led 
Turkey to develop its security strategies and protocols in line with that 
of the alliance, and with the United States in particular. This had the ef-
fect of modernising the Turkish Armed Forces but in a manner that was 
more suitable to harmonisation with NATO approaches than to that of 
others.  Turkish troops have also indicated their own preference for par-
ticipating in NATO or even EU-led peace operations over the UN.160 This 
is in part due to the prestige associated with such missions by the Turk-
ish Armed Forces and the standard of individual salaries in UN missions, 
which have not kept pace with the changes in Turkey. 
Turkey has participated in UN authorised NATO peace operations in 
Bosnia and Kosovo with IFOR, SFOR and Kosovo Force (KFOR) respec-
tively.161 Turkey had been a nominal contributor to International Secu-
rity Assistance Force (ISAF) from 2001. After achieving authorisation as 
a peace operation under Chapter VII in 2003, Turkish activities in ISAF 
expanded from troop contributions to financial support, training, and 
scholarship programs to Afghan Armed Forces.162  
In contrast, Turkey consistently sends police, gendarmerie, and to a 
lesser extent military observers to UN and EU peace operations, and on 
occasion to OSCE missions. With the exception of EUFOR-ALTHEA in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey is providing police and civilian person-
nel to EULEX (The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo); and 
EUPOL COPPS (EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian 
Territories). Similarly, of the 149 Turkish personnel participating in UN 
peace operations as of September 2015, only 49 are troops.163  Given 
their low domestic wages, Turkish police have noted the comparatively 
higher salaries in the UN and EU as a significant incentive to participate 
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in such missions, in addition to the opportunities to acquire new skills 
and language abilities.164 
Turkey’s experiences with different multinational organisations have 
informed and cemented a number of its positions regarding peace oper-
ations. Through these organisations Turkey supports the key peacekeep-
ing principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force. Sovereignty 
has and remains the defining concern for Turkey from the conceptuali-
sation of missions to their operationalisation and engagement with re-
cipient countries. For Turkey, national ownership ranges from including 
national leaders into the mandating and preparation process for peace 
operations, to recipient-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) at the national 
level.165 In supporting this position, Turkish officials point to their own 
experiences, for example, the NATO Training Implementation Mission in 
Iraq from 2004 to 2011, which was initiated at the request of the Interim 
Government of Iraq.  
Turkey has shown increasing preference for participating in peace-
building activities in peace operations. In the last five years, a humani-
tarian agenda has become more prominent in both the rhetoric and fram-
ing of Turkey’s activities from aid to peace operations. This has been 
largely influenced by Turkey’s support for Syrian and Iraqi refugees, 
which they see as Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Turkish officials are 
quick to point out that their reference to R2P in relation to peace opera-
tions is primarily through a humanitarian framework that emphasis ci-
vilian protection rather than unilateral military intervention that other 
countries may emphasize.166  
The challenge of balancing the sometimes opposing forces of sover-
eignty and human-centric operations are extensive. These are issues that 
Turkey has to confront given the increasing emphasis they place on hu-
man security in peacebuilding and development. In this regard Turkish 
officials have sometimes pointed to their experiences with Liaison Ob-
servation Teams (LOTs) in EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Pro-
vincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in ISAF167 as examples of success-
ful development-security activities conducted within peace operations. 
Reflecting this increased emphasis on preventative diplomacy and 
peacebuilding in the last five years, Turkish officials have stressed the 
need for sustained political engagement to support peace. They do not 
believe that military or peace operations can replace political dialogue. 
With particular regard to the UN, Turkey believes that there should be 
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increased cooperation between special political missions and peace op-
erations, especially during political transition phases.168 In this context, 
Turkey believes that special political missions are cost-effective and val-
uable tools in conflict prevention and resolution.169 
Developing achievable and realistic mandates is also seen as a prior-
ity by Turkish officials, particularly with regard to the UN, stressing that 
for efficiency there needs to be consistency between the mandate and 
use of resources.170 Turkey’s officials state that there must also be an in-
clusive process of developing and implementing the mandate that con-
siders the needs and perspectives of the recipient country and its people. 
Reflecting their emphasis on peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping 
activities with the UN, Turkish officials believe that a more efficient way 
to use these resources would be through peace-building initiatives that 
are implemented in cooperation with regional organizations and na-
tional authorities who better understand the peculiarities of individual 
cases.171 In this regard Turkish officials highlight the importance of lin-
guistic and cultural affinity to the success of peace operations, pointing 
to their own experiences in the Balkans. This is something that has been 
reiterated by Turkish police and personnel returning from UN and EU 
missions.  
The importance of an inclusive mandating and preparation process 
to Turkey is evident in its decreasing engagement with EU peace opera-
tions. As a non-EU member, Turkey has no input in the preparation, 
planning, or strategic decisions of the peace operations it is asked to con-
tribute to. While officials claim that these challenges at the institutional 
and political level do not affect the collaboration between Turkish and 
EU forces on the ground, they admit that they create barriers in provid-
ing timely and relevant activities and support for missions and person-
nel.172 For example, in November 2014, the Turkish parliament ap-
proved the deployment of Turkish troops to UN-sanctioned EU missions 
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in the Central African Republic and Mali.173 But to date no Turkish per-
sonnel have been deployed to these missions. 
With regard to national caveats, the Turkish parliament has consist-
ently refused to participate or deploy Turkish troops to combat situa-
tions. For example, in ratifying Turkey’s participation in the UNIFIL, par-
liament specified that Turkish forces would not participate in disarma-
ment activities or be deployed in active combat areas. Despite contrib-
uting significant numbers of troops to ISAF, they were ordered not to en-
gage in fighting or clashes despite pressure from the United States. 
Internal challenges and capacity remain a challenge for Turkey. For 
example, Turkish officials admit that they do not have enough experi-
enced people to meet the increasing demand for personnel in the area of 
rule of law and judicial enforcement for the UN.174 In public statements 
Turkish officials at the UN have stated their support for gender main-
streaming in peace operations. Domestically, gender issues are a politi-
cal and social challenge.  Women’s participation in the Turkish National 
Police remains low with a male/female ratio of approximately 95 to 5.175 
To conclude, Turkey’s traditional conceptualisation and approach to 
peace operations has largely been security based through multilateral 
institutions, particularly NATO. From 2000, however, Turkey’s partici-
pation in peace operations has begun to expand and diversify. Until 
2009, much of these activities, particularly those conducted in new re-
gions, could be attributed to ideological motivations, increasing interna-
tional prestige, and supporting EU membership ambitions. Turkey is 
among the top 10 strongest military forces in the world. The Armed 
Forces are well-trained and equipped with an estimated 510,600 total 
active personnel and a further 378,700 reserve personnel176 in 2014. As 
such there is capacity for Turkey to participate more significantly in a 
range of peace operations than it is currently doing. Renewed internal 
and regional challenges due to the crises in Syria and Iraq, internal dis-
cord, and economic instability are increasingly consuming the Turkish 
state’s resources and will prevent the country from broadening its con-
tributions to peace operations in the immediate future. 
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Conclusion 
Without exception all the countries in this group recognise the UN as the 
legitimate authority to deal with international peace and security issues 
at the global level. They see the UN as the forum where states can reach 
agreement on shared norms and common approaches, and where com-
promises can be negotiated between competing interests. For them, the 
UN is the only institution that, despite its problems, can maintain global 
stability and predictability. A world without the UN would be dangerous 
and unpredictable. The rising powers thus share an interest in maintain-
ing and further strengthening the role of the UN as the apex of global 
governance.  
In this context UN peacekeeping is of special importance. It is the 
most visual and practical manifestation of the UN’s collective security 
regime, and the UN’s role to maintain international security. It provides 
its member states with a common project to steer, manage and execute. 
It is thus not surprising that it is an instrument that the rising powers 
have a special interest in. Whilst there are differences among the rising 
powers on some issues related to challenges facing modern day peace-
keeping, they all agree that peacekeeping is an important tool to pre-
serve and safeguard international peace and security and a stable world.  
In general, they desire a conservative interpretation of the principles of 
UN peacekeeping and would like to reform peacekeeping at a pace that 
the rising powers and global south are comfortable with. In particular, 
these rising powers   wish to check any attempts by the West to use UN 
peacekeeping as a tool to coerce or sanction states that do not conform 
to the West’s neoliberal ideology. 
Some of the rising powers, especially Brazil, India and South Africa 
are positioning themselves for place in a reformed UN Security Council. 
As it is unlikely that China and Russia will agree to any form of Security 
Council reform that will weaken their own positions, the most likely re-
form that the rising powers can reach agreement on would be an increase 
in the permanent members of the council. However, UN Security Council 
reform is seen as a potentially decisive issue and have not featured prom-
inently in the discussions among rising powers. For instance, each of the 
seven BRICS summits that have taken place thus far have acknowledged 
the need for reform and the aspirations of Brazil, India and South Africa, 
but they have not sought to arrive at a common BRICS position on Secu-
rity Council reform. This is atypical as these Summits have generated 
Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report. Rising Powers and Peace Operations 77 
common positions on a wide range of issues, including several other as-
pects related to the macro-economic aspects of global governance.177 
Security Council membership is also commonly mentioned as one of 
the factors that motivate rising powers to contribute to, and otherwise 
actively engage in peacekeeping. For instance, the recent increase in 
Egypt’s and Indonesia’s contributions to UN peacekeeping is seen as 
linked to their respective campaigns for non-permanent seats, and Bra-
zil, India and South Africa’s positions on peacekeeping is presented, at 
times, as part of their long-term posturing for permanent membership of 
the Security Council. However, Security Council ambitions are just one 
of many considerations that influence the decisions that countries take 
when it comes to contributing to UN peacekeeping missions. From the 
foregoing it is clear that for most rising powers the most prominent con-
siderations are geo-political, including the construction of their own re-
gional and international identities and managing conflicts in their own 
neighbourhoods and spheres of influence. 
Money, in the form of reimbursements, is not a major incentive or dis-
incentive for these countries to participate in UN peacekeeping. Only a 
portion of their operational costs are reimbursed, and none of their input 
costs, i.e. equipping and preparing forces for deployment, can be recov-
ered.  The UN owes member states, especially large contributing coun-
tries like India tens of millions of US dollars, and are only able to pay 
these outstanding reimbursements when some of the large financial con-
tributors pay their overdue assessed contributions. Contributing to UN 
peacekeeping thus comes at a net costs to all these countries, yet they 
still find it important to contribute. So the funding aspect is one consid-
eration, but it is not of overriding importance.  
Conflict prevention 
All the rising powers covered in this study strongly agree with the 
HIPPO’s emphasis on conflict prevention and the primacy of politics in 
resolving conflicts. Several countries like Indonesia, South Africa and 
Turkey see themselves as regional peacemakers and are actively in-
volved in several mediation initiatives. In the case of South Africa, there 
is also a strong correlation between its peacekeeping contributions and 
the conflicts in which it had a direct mediation role. In general, all the 
BRICS countries favour diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes and see military intervention as a last resort. When it comes to UN 
peacekeeping this preference for prevention, mediation and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes translated into a strong preference for consensual 
peacekeeping, with the use of force seen as a last resort. The trend to-
wards more robust peacekeeping, where the use of force, or the threat of 
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the use of force becomes part of a routine doctrinal posture is thus ques-
tioned, and instead the emphasis is placed on the resolution of conflicts 
through dialogue and mediation. 
These countries see the role of UN peacekeeping as providing support 
to national actors who have the main agency to achieve sustainable 
peace, not as a tool to impose a solution to the conflict from the outside. 
Countries like Egypt and Russia caution, in addition, that prevention 
shouldn’t be used as a backdoor for intervening in other states affairs. 
All rising powers have expressed that there should be more support for 
Special Political Missions (SPMs), which it sees as cost-effective and val-
uable tools for conflict prevention and resolution. 
The principles of peacekeeping, including the use of force, 
robust peacekeeping and enforcement operations 
All the rising powers in thus study supports the importance and contin-
ued relevance of the principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality 
and the use of force only for self-defence or in defence of the mandate. 
They argue that the principles should remain the cornerstone guidance 
for UN peacekeeping, and that adherence to the principles is the best 
guarantee for successful peace operations. 
In this context the most contentious issue for the rising powers are 
the trend towards greater use of force in UN peacekeeping operations. 
Brazil, for instance, notes with concern the growing willingness of the 
UN Security Council to formulate more and more ambitious mandates for 
UN peacekeeping missions regarding the use of force. In this context 
Brazil argues that there is little evidence of a cause-effect relation be-
tween the increased use of force and better results in terms of protecting 
civilians or protecting forces. Likewise, countries like Egypt, India and 
Indonesia are concerned that blurring the lines between peace enforce-
ment and peacekeeping would make the UN a party to the conflict, and 
in the process undermine faith in the UN, and eventually in peacekeep-
ing as a tool for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
China maintains that peaceful settlement of international disputes and 
non-use of force in international relations is an important principle of 
the UN Charter and a basic norm of international law. It opposes the 
threat or use of force in international relations.  Nevertheless, Beijing 
does not rule out the necessity of using force in peacekeeping under 
some circumstances. It insists that use of force should meet two basic 
requirements: one is the authorisation of the UNSC, the other is that it be 
limited to self-defence or defence of the mandate. 
All of them view that the use of force in a peacekeeping mission as a 
last resort, and argue that it must be minimal, calibrated, proportional, 
and in conformity with international humanitarian law. India and Indo-
nesia are especially concerned about the case of the Forced Intervention 
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Brigade (FIB) that was deployed as part of MONUSCO. India and Indone-
sia argue that such mixing of mandates directly affects the operational 
effectiveness of the overall operation, and exposes normal peacekeepers 
to unnecessary threats from the armed factions targeted by the FIB.  
South Africa, that contributes forces and attack helicopters to the FIB, 
agrees with and support the principles of peacekeeping, but sees the 
eastern DRC as an exception where the M23 and other rebel groups have 
been specifically identified by the UN Security Council as aggressors that 
not only threatens the civilian population, but also the stability of the 
whole eastern DRC. South Africa is of the view that the unchecked ag-
gression of the M23 rebel group, including twice invading and occupy-
ing Goma, undermined not only the UN but also the whole peace process 
in which the UN and international community has invested so heavily. 
Many of the rising powers are concerned about the negative conse-
quences of the use of force. For instance, Brazil argues that despite good 
intentions, military operations can have devastating humanitarian ef-
fects on the civilian population, and always brings with itself the risk of 
collateral damage and of spreading violence and instability. Brazil also 
questions whether the use of force has a positive impact on the political 
process, and argues instead that the use of force risks compromising the 
UN’s impartiality, and where it does, it undermines the UN’s ability to 
mediate and to promote political solutions. 
All the countries studied recognise the close link between the use of 
force and the responsibility to protect civilians from violent conflict. In-
dia and Russia argues that the only sustainable way to achieve protec-
tion is to focus on an inclusive approach to national reconciliation, an-
chored in state sovereignty. They argue that UN peacekeeping opera-
tions do not have adequate resources (manpower, enablers and self-pro-
tection means) to meet the expectations that the Security Council creates 
when it tasks UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians. They ar-
gue that the host nation must bear the primary responsibility for protec-
tion, and that the role of the UN must be to support the host nation in 
executing this responsibility. 
All the countries recognise the close link between peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding, but several of the countries covered in thus study ques-
tion what role peacekeeping missions should play in peacebuilding. 
Most seem comfortable with some basic recovery and outreach activities, 
but are concerned about the outer limits of using peacekeepers as early 
peace builders. They raise three concerns, namely the more political na-
ture of peacebuilding that can impact negatively on the impartiality of 
peacekeeping; the importance of maintaining the principle that peace-
keeping cannot itself deliver peace, and should limit itself to being an 
enabler of a locally owned peace process; and lastly the drain on the fi-
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nancial, material and human resources being allocated for peacekeep-
ing, when peacekeeping missions are given expansive peacebuilding 
mandates. 
Sovereignty and national ownership 
All the rising powers in this study stress the importance of sovereignty 
and national and local ownership. Brazil, China and Russia, for instance, 
argue that it is essential that the role of UN peacekeepers in any activity 
is based on dialogue with the local society, which should have the pre-
rogative to lead the peace process. India, Russia and South Africa argue 
that the imposition of external priorities and solutions without adapting 
to local conditions undermine stabilisation efforts and sustainability. 
Brazil also argues that it is important to make maximum use of existing 
local capacities, including civil society, and strengthen the national in-
stitutions.  All the rising powers emphasise the necessity of respecting 
state sovereignty and national ownership.  
They therefore insist that all activities aimed at building national ca-
pacities and developing the linkage between peace and development 
must be in accordance with the host country’s strategies and priorities. 
India and Turkey is of the view that capacity building should be a key 
focus of UN efforts as affected countries emerge from armed conflict sit-
uations. If the international community wishes to see sustainable peace 
and stability, then state institutions, including in the area of security, 
rule of law and justice, need to be augmented and strengthened. 
Relations between the UN Security Council and T/PCCs 
All the countries in this study call for strengthening the triangular coop-
eration between T/PCCs, the Security Council and the Secretariat. Egypt 
sees this triangular cooperation as the only guarantee of realistic and 
feasible mandates, and as a means of achieving the aspired partnership 
and required effectiveness for the activities of the UN peacekeep-
ing. Changes to the mandates of peacekeeping missions should be pre-
ceded by consultations with troop-contributing countries and securing 
their consent for any change.  
India state that the T/PCCs know the situation on the ground better 
than most, as they are in daily touch with developments and can – on 
the basis of practical experience – offer advise the Security Council and 
the Secretariat. Indonesia argues that T/PCCs need to be fully aware of 
the situation they are getting into, as early as possible in the process. 
This is particularly the case when mandates undergo significant changes 
or when they are being renewed. Brazil, India and Indonesia hold that 
the Security Council should hold regular consultations with the T/PCCs 
during the preparation and the evaluation of peacekeeping mandates. 
Egypt also argues for involving T/PCCs in doctrinal development, policy 
formulation and mandates design and extension. 
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Brazil and Egypt has also supported initiatives that reinforce the po-
litical importance of the C-34. Brazil argues that it is in the interest of the 
member states to help build consensus on the most relevant issues on 
the agenda of the C-34, in order to avoid deadlocks that would weaken 
the UN General Assembly as a forum for dialogue and negotiation on 
peacekeeping; which in turn would give the UNSC the exclusive prerog-
ative to deal with these issues. 
Although all the so-called rising powers covered in this study do not 
agree on every policy issue, they generally share a common normative 
approach to global governance and the importance of the UN, and UN 
peacekeeping, for the maintenance of international peace and stability. 
In particular, they see UN operations as an important common project, 
both in terms of how it serves to bring member states together behind a 
common cause, and in terms of the contributions it makes to help mem-
ber states recover from conflict. Many countries that have benefitted 
from peacekeeping missions in their own past now contribute peace-
keepers to others. As such, peacekeeping is seen by these rising powers 
as a shared experience that help to foster co-ownership of the United Na-
tions identity, and that contributes to a collective security regime and an 
emerging rule-based global order.   


